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INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE

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This study investigates Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW) operations by analyzing selected elements of U.S. Army and German Army IPW experiences from World War II, and by comparing these historical practices to current U.S. Army AirLand Battle Doctrine.

The investigation revealed no meaningful differences between German and American IPW doctrine, practices, operational development, and results in World War II. The analysis identified common lessons learned in areas of decentralization, training and personnel inadequacies, and proximity of the interrogation to the point of capture. Historical results confirm specific values and limitations of intelligence information produced by IPW operations.

Historical analysis reveals that, in general, interrogations conducted closer to the time and place of capture tend to collect more information of current intelligence value for close and rear operations. Interrogations more remote from the time and place of capture, however, tend to collect more information of historical or strategic value. Historical analysis also revealed a common tendency to decentralize IPW personnel and operations to lower echelons over time during war. The study found AirLand Battle doctrine to be conceptually consistent with World War II IPW experience, but organizationally inconsistent with the decentralized trend developed over time.

Using World War II American and German Army IPW experience as a basis, the study concludes that AirLand Battle organization of IPW assets does not efficiently support the lower-echelon interrogation provided for by the doctrine. The study further concludes that IPW operations generate valuable, timely information for close and rear operations, but not for deep operations such as armored assault. The study also concludes that the Army has apparently centralized the peacetime IPW organization at echelons significantly higher than those which historical experience indicated as most effective in wartime.

The study recommends further investigation to determine if IPW assets provided by current AirLand Battle doctrine and organization will be sufficient to support all anticipated IPW missions. The study also recommends further inquiry to determine if current IPW personnel policies and training programs respond adequately to IPW training and personnel problems identified by historical experience.

## ABSTRACT

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE by  
Major William A. Doyle, Jr., USA, 211 pages.

This study investigates Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW) operations by analyzing selected elements of U.S. Army and German Army IPW experiences from World War II, and by comparing these historical practices to current U.S. Army AirLand Battle Doctrine.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Interrogation of prisoners of war may be the only specialized intelligence source available to U.S. Army commanders at different stages of battle in a mid-intensity conflict. Enemy air superiority may negate tactical air reconnaissance and radar imaging. Nuclear weapon use, enemy radio silence, or combat attrition may negate signals intelligence intercept. While each source of intelligence, including combat intelligence by troop units, has its advantages, interrogation has one that the others do not: captors can question prisoners about things the captors wish to know.<sup>1</sup>

This study examines historical lessons to judge the role and implications of interrogation of prisoners of war in AirLand Battle. U.S. and German interrogation of prisoners during World War II are the specific focus in history. This study reviews the ways in which the wartime American and German armies organized their interrogation efforts. This review may provide direction to our modern organization for interrogation of prisoners of war in the AirLand Battle.

#### Background

Commanders make decisions on the basis of a wide variety of information. In war, intelligence on enemy forces is critical to the commander's decision process. The

exploitation of prisoners of war is one method of gaining intelligence on the enemy.

The process of exploiting prisoners of war is known as interrogation. One major difficulty in interrogation is communication with the prisoner. During World War II, for example, most of the prisoners of war captured by the U.S. did not speak English. At first glance it is clear that interrogation is a difficult task. In order to interrogate, those doing so must make themselves understood to another who probably does not speak his language.

The language barrier notwithstanding, the effective interrogation of prisoners of war is an immense task. The process of organizing and planning for the interrogation of prisoners of war is complex. The realization of its complexity stemmed from the author's experience both as a commander and as a staff officer in military intelligence units with an interrogation of prisoner of war mission. Interest in the subject led the author to study the organization for interrogation in both historical and modern applications.

#### Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine how to best organize U.S. Army interrogation resources to contribute to intelligence success in the AirLand Battle. In order to accomplish this purpose, the study analyzes World War II U.S. and German interrogation of prisoner of war operations, and compares historical lessons

to modern doctrine. The study's specific AirLand Battle focus is a mid-intensity (conventional) war, but the study probably applies to high-intensity (specifically, tactical nuclear war) conflict as well. The study also focuses on the type of conflict which the U.S. might have with the Soviet Union, such as might occur in Europe.

#### Research Question

The research question is: How should the U.S. Army organize to conduct interrogation of prisoners of war in a mid-intensity conflict, based on an analysis of World War II U.S. and German Army interrogation of prisoner of war experience?

The research question has other included questions:

a. Is the concept for interrogation in AirLand Battle doctrine consistent with the historical experience of the U.S. and German Armies in World War II interrogation operations?

b. Is the present organization for interrogation under AirLand Battle doctrine consistent with the historical experience?

c. Can interrogation operations contribute significantly to the intelligence effort in AirLand Battle? In order to answer this question, the study addresses the following specific questions:

(1) Was interrogation valuable in U.S. and German Army World War II experience?

(2) Will the AirLand Battlefield appreciably change the value of modern interrogation?

(3) Can interrogation support Close Operations (traditional "frontlines" battle), Rear Operations (battle in friendly rear areas), and Deep Operations (battle in the enemy's rear areas), as envisioned in AirLand Battle doctrine?

(4) Can interrogation support the specific intelligence requirements of commanders at brigade, division, corps, and echelons above corps?

(5) Does the positioning of interrogation operations relative to the point of capture affect the timeliness of information collected?

(6) Can interrogation assist in identifying enemy deception plans?

f. Did the U.S. and German Armies encounter problems in World War II interrogation operations which may affect the U.S. Army today or in the future?

#### Why Study the Interrogation Process?

Major Mark Beto, U.S. Army, writing in Military Review, noted that the German Army in World War II found its interrogation assets inadequately prepared.<sup>2</sup> Research into studies of the World War II U.S. and German intelligence organizations, written after the war, shows that both countries considered their initial organization and training status for interrogation to be inadequate upon entering the war.<sup>3</sup>

The inadequacy of major participants in a major war to interrogate prisoners has an implication for the U.S. Army in future wars. AirLand Battle, with its fluid, mobile battlefield and a high tempo of operations, offers great challenges to the military intelligence unit and to the G2. The intelligence challenges of the AirLand Battle are significant. Rapid and violent collision of forces on the battlefield means that the commander who makes correct decisions in fighting that battle will win. Intelligence is one of the many factors that will contribute to the commander's decision-making. Preparation for war in that environment is critical to success.

An example of the criticality of intelligence, especially from interrogation of prisoners, emphasizes its historical (and possibly future) importance. Postwar analysis of the Battle of the Bulge shows that the interrogation of German prisoners or of civilians who crossed the front lines gave U.S. divisions indications one to two days prior of the massive German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, France, in December 1944.<sup>4</sup> While the reasons for the U.S. surprise at the offensive go beyond interrogation reports, interrogation clearly provided the indications.

History has provided worthwhile bases to analyze other tactics and doctrine. World War II experience in interrogation may provide solutions or direction to the

process of interrogating prisoners of war now and in the future.

Analysis of the U.S. method of interrogation in World War II shows how Americans thought about interrogation of an enemy, especially a European enemy. Historical analysis of German methods of interrogation is beneficial in light of the initial German successes in the war, and because the Germans interrogated Soviets, a likely prospect for American forces in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Further, both Germans and Americans in World War II fought large offensive and defensive operations on a grand scale, and were, to a large extent, very mobile forces for their time. These characteristics will apply on the AirLand battlefield, although the mobility of forces has increased.

#### Significance

This study is significant for several reasons. These include the implications and intelligence requirements of AirLand Battle; the possibility of a nuclear battlefield and other measures which may defeat intelligence systems; resource considerations; and critical need for success in war.

The implications of AirLand Battle are that mid-intensity and high-intensity conflicts will be non-linear, fluid, and mobile, with a high tempo of combat operations. As an example, the World War II so-called German blitzkrieg and the U.S. Army in pursuit contrast remarkably with the comparatively static nature of trench



warfare in World War I. So too may future operations make World War II mobile operations look static in comparison.

The fast-moving, fluid battle has important implications for intelligence. AirLand Battle requires the commander to move forces in a synchronized fashion, throughout the depth of the battlefield, in order to grasp and retain the initiative in battle. Intelligence on enemy intentions, capabilities, and other concerns is a part of the decision framework that the commander uses in fighting the battle.

Interrogation is one method to provide intelligence on these matters. The anticipated fast-moving battle will affect interrogation as well. For example, the movement of prisoners of war to the rear takes time and resources. Time-sensitive information may be worthless by the time an interrogation occurs because the battle is fast-moving. This study will examine historical and modern doctrine to indicate what organizational concepts might prove effective.

AirLand Battle will consume and defeat some of the intelligence means now in the Army inventory. A nuclear battlefield will produce electromagnetic pulse (EMP). This pulse will render communications equipment largely unusable (except for that equipment properly protected from EMP). Combat attrition of technical equipment and specialist operators will rapidly take its toll, necessitating replacement with other, more rudimentary

systems and new operators. System breakage, the use of battlefield obscurants, and other technologies could just as easily handicap collection systems in a future war.

Should some of these occur, and it is likely that some will, commanders will be unable to rely (at least temporarily) on technical intelligence gathering means, such as signals intelligence and some photographic intelligence sensors which depend upon radio or radar communications. During these times, the reliance upon other intelligence methods, such as interrogation, is likely to increase.

There is historical precedent for reliance on interrogation. General Omar Bradley found that cloud cover (which affected photo reconnaissance planes) and a lack of partisan intelligence forced him to rely on interrogation of prisoners during the period just prior to the Battle of the Bulge.<sup>8</sup>

Factors outside the battlefield also affect intelligence, including Human Intelligence, of which interrogation of prisoners of war is a part. Army reorganization under the "Army of Excellence" authorization documents, for example, reduced the number of interrogators at corps and division from previous levels. Continued resource constraints in the Army compel a periodic review of Army activities to determine their relative worth. Based on these reviews, the Army decides whether the activities should continue, cease, change, or revert to the reserve component structure.

Human Intelligence operations involve many resource considerations. There is a considerable cost in training linguist interrogators, and in maintaining them in the force structure as detachments, platoons, companies, and battalions. Overall costs are lower, however, than other collection means because interrogation does not require a multitude of expensive, state-of-the-art systems (as do signals and photographic intelligence systems). Therefore the costs of interrogation after the initial and sustaining costs of training and relatively standard equipment are reasonable. Interrogation itself is arguably a cost-effective process. This study demonstrates the relative merits of interrogation, using analysis of historical operations.

Finally, given reasonable assumptions of a "come-as-you-are" war, at least in NATO, there will be little if any time to complete training of a wartime cadre of interrogators just prior to the war. Similarly, there will be little time for an adjustment period once the war starts. Therefore not only must a cadre of trained interrogators exist, but also commanders and intelligence staff officers must know how to employ and coordinate interrogation operations beforehand. As with other elements of the Army, emphasis must be on preparation now, in peacetime, for success in war. This study intends to determine those elements from historical lessons, which

would, if prepared for in peacetime, contribute to the successful prosecution of AirLand Battle.

#### Terms

Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW): "Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining a source in order to obtain the maximum amount of usable information....Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisoners of war, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents or suspected agents, or other non-U.S. personnel."

Prisoners of War: The definition of prisoners of war is a legal one, and is therefore long and exacting. For the purpose of this study, prisoners of war are "members of the enemy armed forces as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces..."

AirLand Battle: A doctrinal concept of the U.S. Army as specified in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, May 1986. As seen by the Army, it is the likely type of battle and battlefield on which U.S. Army forces could fight in the 1980's and beyond. The AirLand Battlefield will be fluid, mobile, and non-linear (that is, it will not have forces lined up precisely opposing each other in a linear fashion). At least U.S. Army and Air Force units will fight the AirLand Battle in joint operations. Other U.S. services and other allied forces may fight alongside. In other words, the AirLand Battle will be at least joint, and may be combined warfare.

### Study Overview

This study includes a review of literature, the definition of methodology, descriptions of the historical and modern subjects, interpretive analysis, and conclusions. The study has seven chapters.

The first three chapters set the stage. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and justification for the study. Chapter 2 provides the review of literature. This includes a brief discussion on the most valuable sources used in researching the study. Chapter 3 defines the study methodology. The next section of this first chapter, below, contains an overview of the methodology.

Chapter 4 describes World War II-era interrogation operations by the U.S. Army and the German Army. The chapter reviews the doctrine and practice of the era, focusing on U.S. operations in northwest Europe and on the German campaign against the Soviet Union. This chapter also considers some factors that may have been unique to World War II.

Chapter 5 provides the analysis of World War II interrogation operations. These include the similarities, differences, strengths, and shortcomings determined from a comparison of historical interrogation operations. The chapter also discusses the analysis of samples of interrogation reports from U.S. and German interrogations at regiment, division, corps, field army, and theater levels.

Chapter 6 discusses the AirLand Battle-era interrogation doctrine and current resource authorizations. It also contains results of the comparison of historical experience and AirLand Battle doctrine.

Chapter 7 provides the conclusions of the study. One section provides recommendations for further study on the subject.

### Methodology

This section provides an introduction to the methods and procedures the study employs. The major steps in the methodology are literature search, examination of selected World War II interrogation operations, examination of AirLand Battle interrogation doctrine, and a comparison of historical experience with the AirLand Battle doctrine.

#### Literature Search

The first step is the literature search. This search provides the overall context of the study: the doctrine, the general intelligence systems and the historical framework for the study. In the case of World War II, it also provided the raw materials, in this case interrogation reports and summaries for sampling, and associated intelligence material such as standard operating procedures, directives, requirements, and like information.

#### Examination of World War II Operations

This examination determines similarities, differences, strengths, and shortcomings of the World War II

U.S. and German armies' organization and conduct of interrogation operations. The study examines and compares doctrine and practice of the period. The study also examines distinct samples of interrogation reports and summaries of one or both armies at regiment, division, corps, field army and theater echelons. By sampling reports and summaries, the study collects three things. The first is the type of information collected by interrogation, including the frequency in the sample. Second, the samples define the target echelons, such as regimental interrogation focusing primarily on opposing companies and battalions. Third, the sample provides a view into the timeliness of the information collected at each level sampled. These points and the method of examining the interrogation reports or summaries receive an in-depth discussion in Chapter 3, Methodology.

#### German Operations in World War II

Interrogation operations on the Eastern Front targetting the Soviet Army form the primary focus on German operations. The primary source interrogation reports are those of the 5th Panzer Division, the 3d Infantry Division (Motorized), the V Army Corps, and the 4th Panzer Army. These units were part of Army Group Center during the period sampled (between 7 February and 23 March 1942). During this time the divisions, part of the V Corps, were fighting the Red Army west of Moscow, in the vicinity

of Vyazma, to protect the 4th Panzer Army's lines of communications.

Records from the National Archives available at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College originated by the units mentioned and the Foreign Armies East intelligence section of the German Army High Command were the source of interrogation reports, summaries, intelligence requirements, directives, and similar material.

#### U.S. Operations during World War II

The study of U.S. Army interrogation operations focuses on the 12th Army Group, fighting in northwest Europe (France, Belgium, and Germany). The primary source interrogation reports, or summaries thereof, are from the 415th Infantry Regiment of the 104th Infantry Division; the 8th Infantry Division; the VII Corps; and the Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1 of the Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations (ETO). The time period sampled was February and March, 1945. During this period the VII Corps, as a part of First U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, conducted offensive operations from the Roer River to the Rhine River in Germany.

#### Comparison of Historical and Modern Operations

Having analyzed World War II operations to determine the organization for interrogation, the study compares these historical lessons with the doctrine of AirLand Battle. From this comparison the study determines if today's doctrine incorporates the historical lessons. In



other words, this section answers the question, "What historical lessons might reasonably apply in AirLand Battle?"

As part of this comparison, the study considers the applicability of historical factors to AirLand Battle; factors (if any) proving unique to the World War II environment need no further comparison to the present or future. Next, the study considers which implications of AirLand Battle in a mid-intensity or high-intensity conflict, such as speed of movement, increased tempo of operations, and so forth, may affect interrogation operations.

The final step in the methodology is the identification of problems (or differences) and agreements (or similarities) in today's doctrine, compared with the outcome of the World War II analysis.

#### Scope

The scope of the study concerns assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. Assumptions are judgments which are necessary for the study to proceed. Limitations are constraints on the study beyond the author's control. Delimitations are "boundaries" the author places on the study in order to allow an in-depth examination of the subject, rather than a shallow one.

#### Assumptions

The assumptions encompass applicability, research, and methodology. Specifically, the study assumes:

(1) That the lessons of World War II have some application to modern U.S. forces preparing for AirLand Battle.

(2) That the studies prepared by German officers at the end of World War II have their bases in accurate recall (some authors wrote without benefit of records), and have no philosophical or political bias. In the absence of particular information to the contrary, they are taken on good faith; the author notes contrasting views and obvious biases in favor of the victors where encountered.

(3) That German records of the period reflect National Socialist (Nazi) doctrine. For example, National Socialist doctrine viewed non-Aryan races as inferior. This bias of German superiority may appear in and affect the intelligence records of the time, and perhaps the German postwar studies. The author will consider these biases where encountered.

(4) That the information contained in original interrogation reports or summaries is generally credible. This assumption rests on the fact that a detailed examination of hundreds of items of intelligence information to determine their accuracy more than 45 years after the fact is too difficult for the scope of this study.

(5) That interrogation-derived intelligence examined for the study will be just that, and no more. In explanation, it is likely that some World War II

intelligence reporting attributed to prisoner of war sources actually originated from signals intelligence (SIGINT) sources. The purpose of this deception was to protect SIGINT sources from enemy knowledge. The effect of this deception on this study may be to allow attribution of interrogation success to reporting which did not, in fact, come from interrogation. Assuming that most SIGINT came from higher levels (in the U.S. Army, from army group level) to lower ones, this would only affect the examination of interrogation reporting that emanated from an army group or higher level and flowed downwards. In this study, only the U.S. Military Intelligence Service theater-level reports and potentially, German 4th Panzer Army reports might be so affected.

(6) That the labeled division interrogation reports found in the German V Army Corps records on microfilm represent copies of division reports forwarded to corps, and that the record encompasses all those reports that reached the corps.

(7) That the G2 periodic reports of the U.S. 8th Infantry Division contain accurate summaries of the division's interrogation reports during the period February-March 1945.

(8) That interrogation occurred when persons able to communicate with and influence prisoners to talk did so, regardless of the questioner's status as an interrogator or linguist.

(9) (There are specific assumptions related to the methodology in Chapter 3 and to the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.)

#### Limitations

There are certain limitations on this study. First, some of the historical records of German World War II units have not survived the war. Other information, such as historical studies by, or interrogations of, German officers after the war by the U.S. will likely provide specific information on German units.

Second, not all of the German or U.S. records are reasonably available for the purpose of this study. While many records are available at the National Archives, time and cost considerations preclude the full use of such archival material. Those records available at Fort Leavenworth or available through loan will provide the bulk of primary source material.

Third, this study cannot examine the accuracy of the information gathered by interrogation. As noted above, the study assumes that the information gathered is generally credible, and accepts that some of it was false information. By assuming accuracy the study considers the results of interrogation to have portrayed the enemy situation reasonably well. Consider also that any military force in the field, in this case the capturing unit's enemy, may not always be able to carry out its intentions, making accuracy even more difficult to judge.

Fourth, another factor beyond the scope of this study was the status of training of the interrogators in both the language and culture of the prisoners. As assumed above, soldiers of the capturing unit who could talk to prisoners probably did so, whether those soldiers were interrogators or not. In other words, some soldiers probably acted as or became official interrogators even though not trained as such.

#### Delimitations

The study has certain delimitations. This study focuses on U.S. and German World War II interrogation doctrine and operations from 1939 to 1945 in Northwest and Eastern Europe. The study does not concern itself specifically with campaigns of either army in Italy, Southern France, or Africa except where some specific lesson is relevant to this case. As an example, changes in interrogation operations resulting from the campaign in Italy are pertinent, but the study does not dwell unnecessarily on the conduct of interrogations in Italy.

The study also concerns itself outside the strict realm of "enemy prisoners of war" as defined above, and considers relevant effects of the interrogation of civilians. The study also considers relevant effects of the exploitation of captured documents and materiel. These additional topics are integral to interrogator duties and thus deserve consideration.

## CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>David Kahn, Hitler's Spies, (1985): 151.

<sup>2</sup>Mark D. Beto, "Soviet Prisoners of War in the AirLand Battle," Military Review, (December, 1984): 64.

<sup>3</sup>Alfred Toppe, "German Methods of Interrogating Prisoners of War in World War II," U.S. European Command Historical Division, MS# P-018a, (1949): 12. U.S. Forces, European Theater, "Military Intelligence Service in the ETO," (The General Board Study # 12)(undated): 11.

<sup>4</sup>Royce L. Thompson, "American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive 1 November - 15 December 1944" (1949): 5-6. See also John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, (1970): 205, 210, 211, 216-217. For a former intelligence staff officer's description of the intelligence picture see Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr., "The Bulge: A Glimpse of Combat Intelligence," Military Review (1961): 29-33.

<sup>5</sup>Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, (1951): 460.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation (1978): 1-3.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons (1976): 1-1.

## CHAPTER 2

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This study concerns three major topics: American interrogation in World War II, German interrogation in World War II, and modern U.S. interrogation centering around AirLand Battle and the Army of Excellence authorization documents (circa 1984 to 1987). There is a body of literature which concerns each topic, as well as a general body of literature on prisoners of war. The literature review will consider each topic and the general category separately.

#### Works Concerning U.S. Interrogation in World War II

##### Doctrine

Field Manual 30-15, in its 1940 and 1943 versions, and with a change in 1944, describes the functions and organization of interrogation operations. As Army doctrine of the period, it is a useful source to understand the structure and intent of the Army in conducting interrogation operations, as well as the exploitation of captured documents and materiel. The significance of this source is that, as in other Army doctrine, it will likely have made use of the experience of the Army in the field to produce "the Army way" of doing things, in this case, interrogations. As an example, the manual recommends that captured officers be interrogated early, but indicates that the information they provide was more likely to be false.

This type of information probably came from experience in the field.

The manual prescribes the phases of interrogation, reporting procedures, and the organization of the force, in general terms, to accomplish interrogation. Within a theater of war, the doctrine says that the theater G2 and his intelligence section supervise the distribution of interrogation teams and coordinate team activities.

The manual also details specific training requirements for interrogators, including both friendly and enemy aspects. An interrogator must know enemy tactics, history, politics, culture (and a host of other items) and he must know the organization, methods of combat, and intelligence procedures of the U.S. Army thoroughly to be effective, according to 1944 doctrine.

The manual recognizes the need for coordination with military police. It discusses requirements to coordinate with military police forces guarding and processing the prisoners of war.

#### Operations

One of the General Board Studies of U.S. Forces, European Theater, Study number 12, "Military Intelligence Service in the ETO" discusses in detail the intelligence operations in the European Theater of Operations from a postwar perspective. The study concerns interrogation, photographic interpretation, interpreter, and order of battle teams of the Military Intelligence Service in the



theater. The board used G2 surveys and a team of intelligence and staff officers to provide conclusions and recommendations concerning the employment of MIS. This study discusses in detail the organization, training, successes or value of interrogation teams (and other teams, as noted above) as well as the equipment used by each team.

The study discusses the organization, manning, and command of teams in the European theater. The Military Intelligence Service underwent some changes during the period in order to properly provide for the command, control, and administration as well as for the operation of interrogators. This document prescribes the organization of interrogation teams by echelon, and the use of interpreter teams to supplement the interrogation effort as well as to conduct document exploitation.

As concerns training, the study reports that interrogation teams arrived in the theater (Great Britain) with good theoretical knowledge, but with no real experience in interrogating prisoners. The Military Intelligence Service arranged for its interrogators to train with combat units, and to work with British interrogators at PW cages in Britain, under British supervision. In November 1943, MIS arranged for several teams to work with 5th Army in Italy.

The value of interrogation operations in the theater becomes clear in this study. A survey of the G2's in the theater determined views on intelligence in general, including the relative importance of interrogation. Those

surveyed indicated that interrogation of prisoner of war specialist teams of the Military Intelligence Service provided some thirty-six percent of all combat intelligence in the European theater. This concerned intelligence available to division, corps, and army levels. The reasons given for the relatively high contribution were the high level of skills ultimately employed by interrogators and the eagerness of prisoners to provide information. While the majority of G2's indicated that IPW teams produced the most valuable information, they considered the order of battle teams the most valuable teams of the Military Intelligence Service. The order of battle teams did not produce intelligence, however; they simply analyzed it for the G2. The G2's considered the information provided by photo interpreters not to be timely.

Chapter 1 of the thesis discusses as an assumption the matter of disguising information derived from Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) as interrogation reports. The General Board study does not differentiate on this point, nor does it discuss SIGINT and its role in theater intelligence; SIGINT organizations were apparently not part of the Military Intelligence Service. Since there is no means to measure the effect of SIGINT reports which higher headquarters may have disguised as interrogation reports, the results of the survey must stand as is, with the knowledge that the possibility of SIGINT inclusion into the reports does exist.

The general board study provided conclusions and recommendations. Among these was the conclusion that two IPW teams per division were insufficient. The study also recommended the assignment of specialist teams (not attachment, as MIS teams were) to each division on a permanent basis, and recommended that the team include document analysts.

LTC Thomas C. Van Cleve wrote a manuscript entitled, "Report on the Activities of Two Agencies of the CPM [Captured Personnel and Materials] Branch, MIS [Military Intelligence Service], G2, WDGS [War Department General Staff]." This document discusses the development of "joint interrogation centers" within the United States to provide for joint service exploitation of European and Asian prisoners of war. It provides in-depth information on the center at Fort Hunt, Virginia, where LTC Van Cleve worked, and where MIS interrogated German PWs.

The document provides information on the method of selecting prisoners for strategic or detailed interrogation, including selection criteria. It discusses the use of eavesdropping equipment and informants among the prisoners, both of which Van Cleve found to be of great importance. The author also provides insights into the operation of joint service interrogation centers, including recommendations on their operation, command, and control.

This document is valuable in demonstrating the efforts of the War Department to collect and process

strategic level information outside the theaters of war. The amount of trouble and expense involved in building and operating these camps, including extensive electronic eavesdropping equipment, gives an indication of the relative importance attached to prisoner interrogation by the G2 of the War Department.

The U.S. Twelfth Army Group produced a final after action report at the end of the war. Volume III of the "Report of Operations, Final After Action Report, 12th Army Group," concerns the G2 section. This document provides a tremendous overview of all aspects of intelligence operations within the army group. This treatment includes tactical intelligence, terrain analysis, photographic intelligence, signals intelligence (to a limited degree), and human intelligence. The human intelligence topics include the Office of Strategic Services relationship with the 12th Army Group, use of agents, patrolling, and interrogation of prisoners of war and of civilians.

The report discusses the intelligence process as the 12th Army Group moved eastward across Europe, mostly in a historical light. It provides the number of PW captured during different phases of the operation, more as an indication of tactical success than as a complete report on intelligence success. It provides a detailed list of German divisions that fought against the 12th Army Group, noting their commitment and destruction and, in some cases,

reconstitution. The report includes maps and enemy order of battle situations for some of the major campaigns.

The report provides an in-depth discussion of the relative worth of, and recommendations for, the employment of intelligence means. The basis for this was a survey sent to subordinate armies, corps, and divisions, and the results of a conference on these subjects. The 12th Army Group also sent a team of officers to subordinate units to ensure that the results obtained on the survey were accurate. The general topics covered included the organization of intelligence specialist teams for combat, the provision of different types of intelligence from higher headquarters to lower, and the relative use and value of each type of intelligence. As such, this report is valuable to provide an "expert" view of relationships, organizations, and the conduct of intelligence operations at the "operational" level.

As noted above and in Chapter 1, however, the influence of SIGINT reports disguised as interrogation (or other) reports to protect the SIGINT source is difficult to measure based on this document. Therefore any researcher must take the considerations and conclusions in the document at face value.

This report includes a portion entitled the "Report of Operations of the G2 (Intelligence) Branch, 12th Army Group." This portion of the overall report has undergone publication as a separate document. This can be confusing

to researchers, but the two reports contain the same information.

The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force published a classified document entitled, "Intelligence Directive Number 3, History of the American Element of I.S. 9 (WEA)" This document provides information on the American side of a combined Anglo-American effort to brief allied soldiers on what to expect if captured, and discusses allied plans and preparations for evasion and escape operations. It does contain a somewhat humorous briefing given to combat troops on what they should expect if captured by the Germans. This information came from escapees debriefed by the I.S. 9 organization. Incidentally, the document never discloses the I.S. 9 nor WEA abbreviations; "I.S." may well mean "Intelligence Service."

The I.S. 9 (WEA) document is presently classified confidential. It is therefore useful for general background review, but since it is not portion-marked, it was not used specifically as source material for this thesis. The document's discussion of German inducements to American PWs to get them to talk is fairly consistent with what the Germans said they did in other sources.

Paul Carell and Guenter Boeddeker discuss the fate of more than 11 million German PWs in the hands of the Allies in Die Gefangenen (The Prisoners). This book, in German, provides detailed accounts of Germans imprisoned on five

continents during World War II. The book deals largely with the accounts of prisoners, and with historical records. There is not a great deal of information on interrogation in the book, but it does discuss British methods of interrogating German U-boat crews, and some successes that resulted from that. This book provides compelling narratives of Germans suffering at the hands of the Soviets. The author comments that as the German PWs received better treatment from their U.S. and British captors than from their Russian captors, so too the Germans treated U.S. and British PWs better than Russian PWs.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Arnold Krammer's Public Administration of Prisoner of War Camps in America Since the Revolutionary War provides an in-depth bibliography. Krammer's comprehensive bibliography focuses on the administration of PW camps in America during World War II; he provides selected bibliographies for the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and World War I.

Krammer is a prolific author on the subject of prisoners of war. His book, Nazi Prisoners of War in America concerns mainly the handling of German prisoners brought to the United States, not their exploitation by intelligence services before or during arrival. He does comment, briefly, on two effects that degraded the intelligence exploitation of prisoners of war. One was the looting of prisoners by those who handled them. Frequently American soldiers from the capturing units rearward looted

the PWs, taking among other things documents key to the interrogation, such as the soldier's paybook. Secondly, Krammer notes that the system of registering PWs usually had few, if any, persons capable of speaking German. The detrimental result of this was the ability of German prisoners, especially ones who were prime exploitation targets, to escape detection or "slip through" the net of bureaucratic ineptness by feigning ignorance, registering under another name, or otherwise foiling the system.

John Hammond Moore, in The Faustball Tunnel, devotes a chapter to the interrogation operation at Fort Hunt, Virginia. His remarks contrast some of LTC Van Cleve's. Moore centers on the exploitation of German U-Boat officers and crews. His conclusion on interrogation is that the prisoners considered the Fort Hunt effort to be inept (Moore interviewed many ex-prisoners of war for his book). Note that the time when U-Boat crews were the prime target of interrogation (as Moore describes) was the early part of the war. In addition, former PW may be unwilling to admit to the success of their interrogators. On the other hand, while Van Cleve indicates that Fort Hunt's efforts improved with experience, Van Cleve's bias as a former member of the command bears consideration as well.

#### Works Concerning German Interrogation in World War II

##### Doctrine

The German Army High Command published its then-secret regulation number 89, Feindnachrichtendienst (Enemy



Intelligence Service) in 1941. This regulation contains the basic doctrine for German intelligence operations overall, and for interrogation in particular, with which the Germans operated in the war's early stages. This document provides a very valuable insight into the doctrine of the time; in fact there were changes to the interrogation doctrine within a year of this document's publication. The regulation also discusses the duties of the intelligence officer (IC or special staff officer at regiment and below), as well as the employment and evaluation of other sources of intelligence.

#### Operations

Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and several other authors, among them Generalmajor Rudolf Langhäuser, produced "German Methods of Interrogating Prisoners of War in World War II," as one of the U.S. European Command's Historical Division's studies after the end of the war. Toppe discusses the methods of organization and training, and the conduct of interrogations of Russian prisoners of war during World War II. The document does not discuss the interrogations of U.S., French, or British PW except in general terms.

Toppe furnishes detailed organizational discussions. These include descriptions of the equipment, the echelon at which interrogations occurred, and the different types of PW camps employed at each echelon.

The focus of the discussion on training concerns culture differences and the lack of German preparedness. The Germans quickly learned (or perhaps began

with the premise) that the Russian "eastern man" was quite different culturally from them as "western man." Toppe therefore discusses certain changes the Germans made in the training of interrogators and in techniques used to approach prisoners after November 1941.

Toppe reports that the training of German interrogators was inadequate when the war began. In fact, there was no training for interrogation in the German Army before the war. Using practical experience and "lessons learned" from the campaign in Poland, the Germans used new measures and improved on training of interrogators. They also took steps to properly train officers in staff positions who would direct the interrogation effort. The German task was greatly increased by virtue of the more than 50 dialects in the Red Army, the prevailing lack of knowledge about Russia and its armed forces, and a lack of skilled linguists.

The conduct of interrogation by the Germans underwent changes during the war as training improved and as German successes on the Eastern Front diminished. For example, Toppe notes that there was a decrease in interrogations during the retirement of German forces (this of course resulted in fewer prisoners), but the German Army still collected a good deal of information using interrogation until the close of the war. In addition, interrogation requirements (i.e., that information which the army wished to know from prisoners), most of which were inadequate at

the beginning of the Russian campaign, had also improved by early in 1942, and by later that year were considered excellent, in Toppe's judgment.

General Toppe also describes specific concerns that affected interrogation. Among these are the type of enemy interrogated and foreign politics. Toppe provides a clear example of the need for an interrogator to know his source's culture, noting that the interrogation of a Moslem during his prayer time made the Moslem prisoner an unwilling source. Concerning politics, Toppe criticizes the failure of German political leaders to honor promises made early in the war, suggesting that this failure was later detrimental to the interrogation effort. By this he refers to the later uncooperative attitude of Russian prisoners when they realized that the Germans were not their liberators from the Soviet regime in a sense anticipated in the Ukraine early in the war.

Another important concern was the tactical situation. Toppe maintains that the effect of the tactical situation has a bearing on whether prisoners talk willingly or not. He cites the humane treatment offered to PW by the Germans as the reason that Russians of all nationalities willingly gave reliable and accurate information during interrogation. By this he probably means the generally humane treatment immediately after capture.

This very comprehensive document also points out the end result of the German's interrogation efforts. Toppe

claims that, by the spring of 1942, the Germans had built up a mass of knowledge about Russian equipment, forces, commanders, war industry, etc., and further claims that the Germans therefore knew in advance the "day and hour" of "almost every" Russian intention. Unfortunately, claims Toppe, Hitler turned a deaf ear to this important intelligence.

This work is a very valuable source. In addition to the detailed text, the document contains as appendices some types of interrogation questions and report formats reconstructed by former German intelligence staff officers who worked on the manuscript with Toppe.

Another major source is the U.S. War Department's work titled, "German Operational Intelligence." This document provides detailed information on German IPW organization, principles, techniques, and training. This item dwells on German intelligence overall during the period from 1941 to 1943, when German forces were for the most part successful, as were their intelligence services. It provides information on more than just interrogation: it includes signals intelligence, patrols, and other collection methods.

Organizational information in the study addresses duties and responsibilities of interrogation elements at each echelon (usually regiment to army). The Germans frequently questioned PWs starting at battalion level, however, for information of tactical value, and then sent

the PW along to regiment, where the more formal interrogation process started.

The Germans established several general principles to guide their interrogation effort. These concerned interrogation approaches to the prisoner (i.e., how to get a prisoner to talk), how to exploit the moral effects of capture, cultural implications, and the treatment given to prisoners who don't cooperate (solitary confinement). According to the document, the Germans had a basic ground rule: never damage the dignity of the prisoner of war as a soldier.

It is worthwhile to note here that this document was compiled by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department from Allied intelligence publications and from interrogations of German General Staff officers throughout the war. The German officers, some perhaps interrogated in the times during and after the Nuremberg war crimes trials, may have gone to some lengths to prove their own innocence of war crimes. The principles cited in the document are not consistent with other, long-term German methods of treatment of prisoners, notably Russian and Polish prisoners, many of whom met their deaths at the hands of their captors.<sup>2</sup>

This document notes that German interrogation techniques closely paralleled those of the Allies, perhaps because the Germans exploited Allied documents cautioning allied soldiers as to their expected behavior if captured. Where differences existed, say the authors, it was because

the Germans had intelligence organizations and staffs that were less elaborate and had fewer personnel than did the Allies.

This study makes clear German discontent with the training of interrogators. In introductory remarks the authors indicate that the interrogators were generally of poor quality. Key problems included both the language ability and the knowledge of military and cultural affairs necessary to conduct interrogations well. Bear in mind that the German Army's view of success in linguist matters may well have been a more formal and objective view than the contemporary U.S. Army, or perhaps than the U.S. Army today.

Another very valuable source is the U.S. Forces Europe Interrogation Center report entitled, "The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign," also known as Ic Dienst Ost (G-2 Service East) and as the First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report. This document provides an examination of the intelligence structure from the Army High Command's intelligence staff (Fremde Heere Ost, or Foreign Armies East), through army group, army, corps, and division level. In addition to discussing the G-2 duties at each level, the report provides an insight into the use of every collection source (prisoners, photo reconnaissance, signals intelligence, long-range reconnaissance, line crossing operations, and documents) at each level, and of the interplay between them. Thus from this document, completed in July 1945, we see that the German Army

practiced the art of all-source intelligence in the Russian campaign.

The information provided about interrogation is detailed and enlightening. The report clearly shows interrogation operations in context as part of the overall intelligence system, interrelating with other sources of information and providing a defense against deception.

One of the document's "sources" is Reinhard Gehlen, former head of Fremde Heere Ost and later chief of West Germany's Federal Intelligence Service. The reader should be careful of Gehlen's assurance that the Army High Command (and, to a great extent, the rest of the intelligence system downward) was extremely successful in all of its operations in divining Russian intentions. At the time this report was in progress, Gehlen and some of his staff were (successfully) bartering their knowledge of the Soviet Union with the United States. Gehlen's view of his own success thus should remain somewhat suspect, but the things he says are, in the main, reasonable. Indeed, they bear similarity to accepted modern intelligence doctrine.

A book entitled German Military Intelligence 1939-1945 (University Publications of America, Inc., Frederick, MD, 1984) includes the two studies, "The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign" and "German Operational Intelligence" in book form. The maps in this book are poor, even worse than the photostat copies in "The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign." The maps are not

essential for a clear understanding of the system, but do serve to amplify the discussion of map posting and the cross-checking of intelligence information.

Another U.S. Army Europe postwar study discusses the collection of intelligence against the Red Army. Generalmajor Rudolf Langhäuser and others wrote, "Studie über die Beschaffung von Feindnachrichten im deutschen Heer während des 2. Weltkrieges an der Ostfront" [Study on the Collection of Enemy Intelligence in the German Army during the Second World War on the Eastern Front]. This study provides an enlightening insight into the working-day problems with intelligence collection. Concerning interrogation, for example, the study discusses the limitations of the operations, including the lack of knowledge of the ordinary Russian prisoner because of tight security precautions in the Red Army, where maps received treatment as classified documents. This is an important critical work, in which the German efforts toward perfection of their intelligence system is a clear theme. This study, as the title implies, is in German.

Alfred Streim's Die Behandlung Sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa" [The Handling of Soviet Prisoners of War in Operation Barbarossa] is a detailed summary of German handling of Soviet PWs after the German invasion of Russian in 1941. Written in German by a war crimes lawyer, it provides an interesting backdrop to research on the interrogation and handling of Soviet



PWs. The book provides the organization of the Germans for prisoner of war activities and notes how this organization changed during the war.

The book's main focus, however, is a summary of criminal actions taken by the Germans against Soviet Pws, taken from historical records of the PW and concentration camps, the Army, the PW administration, various police files, and personal eyewitness accounts. This legal documentation of PW handling provides compelling accounts of the mistreatment of Soviet PWs by the Germans. According to this book, 5,163,381 Soviets were prisoners of war. Of those, 2,402,200 died or were executed in German custody. Streim's research into legal and historical files concludes that the Germans executed at least 140,000 Soviet PWs.<sup>3</sup> This represents only the number he could count; he has concluded that the Germans killed more than that number.

Streim's work discusses the reasons for the murder of prisoners, mainly focusing on Hitler's infamous "commissar order." This order directed that captured Red Army political commissars and functionaries be executed by the German SD (Sicherheitsdienst or Security Service) or by troops if the SD was not available when these persons were captured. Hitler looked upon these persons as dangers which might infect Germans or other prisoners, and considered them not to be soldiers; therefore Germany was not bound to treat them as PWs.

There are disputes over the number of Soviet PWs that the Germans killed. Bailey, in Prisoners of War (reviewed later in this chapter), claims that the Germans killed 473,000 Soviet PWs.<sup>7</sup> This controversy aside, the main point is that one must consider German brutality toward, and murder of, Soviet prisoners when measuring the credibility of German postwar accounts of prisoner handling.

General Kurt von Tippelskirch produced a study entitled, "Army High Command: Intelligence on Foreign Armies and the Foreign Intelligence Service, 1938-1945" as a part of the U.S. Army's project on the German Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) at the end of the war. This study discusses German intelligence successes against the French, British, Americans, and Russians. It concerns the effect of signals intelligence, interrogation of PW, document exploitation (particularly of French and U.S. Army Post Office (APO) numbers and the exploitation of foreign press), and the use of agents. It contains a list of different types of German intelligence products, such as daily or weekly reports, and the usual frequency of their publication. This is a very brief study, but provides general insights (one suspects from memory; von Tippelskirch commanded the 21st Army and surrendered to the Allies in May, 1945) on the vulnerabilities that the Germans found and exploited in the allied nations.

David Foy's For You the War is Over: American Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany, is a survey of experiences

of the American PW. The book provides an overview of the interrogation process, and contains a good bibliography, as well as locations of the prisoner of war camps. It does not dwell on interrogation by the Germans in great detail, but does discuss the German camps at Oberursel, Luckenwalde, Limburg, and the Dietz Castle (note that this may be Diez, as discussed in Kahn's Hitler's Spies).

The "German General Staff," Volume XIII, from the U.S. Army Europe Historical Studies series provides only a brief discussion of interrogation. Specifically, the report notes that in early interrogation efforts, dissemination of the results was not timely. It also concludes that lower echelons did not ask the right questions of PWs to suit the needs of upper levels of command. In other words, the Germans experienced a problem with intelligence requirements for the interrogation early in the war.

The author, Generalmajor Rudolf Langhäuser, claims to have established a prisoner interrogation service for the army, complete with interpreters and motorcycle messengers. According to the author, this service provided timely and useful reports during the subsequent campaign in France.

David Kahn's Hitler's Spies is an extremely detailed book concerning German intelligence in World War II and its origins prior to the war. The book covers every conceivable intelligence topic, often in great detail. Its very rich bibliography attests to the depth that Kahn researched his topics. The book contains an entire chapter on

interrogation. Kahn uses German unit records as sources, as well as more familiar ones, already discussed, from the postwar Historical Studies of U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Forces, European Theater. His work correlates other sources.

Hitler's Spies is a good place to start any research on the German system, due to its thorough coverage of all aspects, including doctrine and regulations, as well as the atmosphere surrounding the Army and other intelligence gathering apparatus, such as the Abwehr. Kahn's work places other general works and studies in perspective with the times and the war.

Other works cover interrogation from a wider perspective, sometimes on both sides more than just World War II. Barker discusses German interrogations, especially those accomplished at Oberursel by the Luftwaffe, in Prisoners of War, mentioned under the heading of "General Works Concerning Interrogation Operations."

The U.S. National Archives Records of German Field Commands is a rich source of microfilmed German documents captured in World War II. Index Guides to these records contain listings of the subject and date. One of the most profitable sources for this study was the record of the V Armee Ic (V Army Corps G2) section from 7 February to 30 April 1942, a period covering the Soviet counteroffensive west of Moscow. The microfilm series is T-314, roll 252, found in Index Guide #55.

Roll 252 includes a study on the Red Army airborne divisions by V Army Corps, daily "G2" reports, and a myriad of interrogation reports. These reports originate from V Army Corps, its subordinate divisions (3d Motorized, 23d Infantry, 5th Panzer, and 11th Panzer Divisions), and from Dulag (Durchgangslager, or transit camp for PWs) 230 and Dulag 124. Some regiment and battalion task force (Kampfgruppe or Abchnitt) interrogations are also in this record. The files include a few summaries from 4th Panzer Army, of which V Army Corps was a part. These are summaries of important PW interrogations in reports to 4th Panzer Army subordinates and to its next higher HQ, Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center). There are several Abwehr interrogation reports in this file as well, from Dulag 124.

National Archives microfilm series T-78 contains records of the Oberkommando des Heeres/Fremde Heere Ost (Army High Command/Foreign Armies East), the intelligence staff with responsibility for the Eastern Front. The index to the microfilm is in National Archives Index Guide #82 to the German reports. Following paragraphs present information on several rolls reviewed during this study.

Roll 548 contains a list of Foreign Armies East intelligence requirements sent to Army Groups, records of one Soviet unit on KARDEX files (some of these reference interrogations as sources of information), and documents from a Soviet courier plane exploited by the Germans.

Roll 561 in the series contains (poor) copies of teletype reports from units in the field, including Panzer Armeeoberkommando 1 (1st Panzer Army) to Foreign Armies East. These represent the summary reports passed from field units to the Army High Command staff daily.

Roll 581 contains a collection of PW statements concerning Soviet recruitment, replacement, and training during the period November to December 1943. These reports originated from different German army units fighting in the East.

Roll 587 contains a memorandum written within Fremde Heere Ost in January 1945 suggesting methods to improve intelligence training and personnel. The roll also contains intelligence reports of all kinds which suggest Soviet operational intent in different periods: November 1943; March 1944; February 1944; and December 44 to February 1945.

Roll 674 contains a summary of all important reports, including interrogation reports, press reports, diplomatic reports, and agent reports, for the period October 1942 to December 1944. This file represents the Fremde Heere Ost staff's compilation of apparently important events or indicators from different types of sources. This is a very interesting document for those who may wish to study the use or analysis of different sources of information.

Roll 677 of this series contains several important documents. First, it contains the course of study for the G2 Training (Ic-Lehrgang) conducted by Fremde Heere Ost in

Posen (Poznan, Poland). It also includes the Merkblatt für Korps- und Division-In (Pamphlet for Corps and Division G2s), dated 1 October 1943, that Fremde Heere Ost published. Both of these concern interrogation, although only in general detail.

#### General Works Concerning Interrogation Operations

A.J. Barker devotes an entire chapter to interrogation in Prisoners of War. He discusses British interrogation techniques in World War II in some detail. Barker indicates that the Americans used similar methods, but does not elaborate. The book also discusses German methods, and interrogation in other wars after World War II. Barker's book is a survey of prisoner of war life across the spectrum from World War I to the present, containing many personal PW accounts. This same book bears the title Behind Barbed Wire in its British publication version.

Howard Levie's Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict is a general legal study on the rights and privileges of PWs accruing after the 1949 Geneva Convention. As such, the work is too late for its consideration of events taking place in World War II, but it does point out that interrogation had not been prohibited under the previous (1929) Convention, nor under the 1949 version. Levie alludes to the maltreatment of PWs occurring under German and Japanese control. He says that war crimes did occur due to illegal interrogation. In support of this

he cites the trial of Killinger, commandant of the Dulag Luft at Oberursel by the allies. Killinger was found guilty and sentenced to five years imprisonment. He does not mention the Soviet treatment of German PWs. He notes (agreeing in principle with David Kahn's Hitler's Spies) that capture provides the best time to interrogate PWs due to their shock and fear of the unknown, which of course includes their forthcoming treatment from the capturing force."

In Prisoner of War, Pat Reid and Maurice Michel dispute the value of interrogation in a two-page treatment of the subject. Reid formerly served as a major in the British Army. He was a prisoner of war at Colditz Castle from 1940 to 1942, but escaped to Switzerland. Reid and Michel maintain that, while an interrogator can get prisoners to talk, the information that they give may be of no value (or at least, they hope it is no longer valuable, which in some ways makes it acceptable for them to talk). The authors also point out that soldiers wear insignia which contributes, without their having spoken a word, to their enemy's knowledge of forces opposite them. (As we shall see, unit identification is one of the more common results of interrogation.)

#### Personal Accounts of Prisoners of War

In addition to the specific works cited, there are many books which concern prisoners of war and their personal experiences. These books are a part of many bibliographies



and card indexes on the subject of prisoners of war, but are not always germane to the topic of interrogation. The bibliography includes in a separate section some of the personal accounts of prisoners of war reviewed during this study. Generally speaking, these books were useful in understanding the conditions and environment of the prisoner more than in providing information on interrogation.

#### Works Concerning AirLand Battle Interrogation Operations

U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, of May, 1986 is the basic publication for AirLand Battle doctrine. This field manual provides the theoretical base for all other doctrine, force design, etc. It emphasizes the conduct of operational warfare by campaigns. It provides the framework for the conduct of conventional military operations of combined arms, sister services, and allies. Its doctrinal elements deserve consideration in the analysis of any force structure or role which purport or intend to support the Army's warfighting operations in AirLand Battle.

FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation, September, 1978, (incorporating change two) provides the insights into the interrogation processes prior to the first iteration of AirLand Battle doctrine in 1982. FM 30-15 discusses the organization for interrogation under the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) concept at battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels. It does not discuss armored cavalry regiment or separate brigade support, nor

the "echelons above corps," (principally because echelon above corps doctrine was only emerging in the late 1970's).

This manual combines the organization for interrogation with techniques and examples. It does so in 179 pages, a distinct change from the 30-page FM 30-15 of 1943. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation will, when published, supercede this 1978 manual.

Presuming that FM 34-52 (pending publication) will generally follow the lines of its predecessor document, now known as Field Circular (FC) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, then FM 30-15 of 1978 will be the last interrogation manual discussing organizational level interrogation as well as specific interrogation doctrine and techniques. The reason: later interrogation doctrinal manuals do not in themselves discuss the Army's organization for interrogation. This discussion occurs instead in field manuals on intelligence and electronic warfare operations at specific echelons.

Due to the planned supersession of FM 30-15 (1978), the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School published Field Circular 34-116, Interrogation Operations, in September, 1985. This document acts as an update to FM 30-15 until publication of FM 34-52.

Apparently FC 34-116, Interrogation Operations, influenced the design and content of the forthcoming FM 34-52. This appears so because Field Circular 34-52,

Intelligence Interrogation, (the interim doctrine pending publication of FM 34-52) is almost the same document.

Both documents provide a detailed treatment of tasks associated with interrogation and document exploitation. They both provide a general overview of how interrogation operations fit into the command and control environment, such as specifying command and control relationships, coordination, and how the interrogation process assists the intelligence staff in preparing and updating the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process.

FC 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, provides more recent information on strategic debriefing and joint interrogation operations, however. Both documents are very comprehensive. Their contents provide a valuable guide to individual and collective training in interrogation units.

The organization of Army resources for interrogation receives treatment in Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, August, 1984. This manual provides a detailed discussion of the entire intelligence system designed to support the AirLand Battle. FM 34-1, in a departure from earlier doctrine such as FM 30-15, discusses interrogation support to the armored cavalry regiment, separate brigade, and the echelons above corps. The manual includes a table which shows how the intelligence assets at virtually every level above battalion provide support to lower echelons.

Specific field manuals discuss specific echelons' intelligence and electronic warfare functions and organization. Field Manual (FM) 34-80, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, November, 1985, provides information on interrogation at battalion level (as an exception rather than as a rule), and at brigade. Field Manual 34-10, Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, provides a discussion of the interrogation organization at division.

FM 34-20, Military Intelligence Group (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) (CEWI) (Corps), May, 1983, provides only the most brief discussion of the interrogation company in the corps group's Tactical Exploitation Battalion. Since publication of the manual, the Military Intelligence (MI) group at corps has become a brigade, and the Interrogation company has been consolidated with the Counterintelligence company in the Tactical Exploitation Battalion. A reduction in interrogator strength occurred in this process.

Field Circular (FC) 34-37, Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, discusses in general how the echelon above corps (EAC) system operates. Specifics appear in Field Circular (FC) 34-124, Military Intelligence Battalion Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC), November, 1985. The battalion conducts interrogation, document exploitation, and technical

intelligence functions. This document discusses the battalion's organization and doctrinal support to corps and joint and allied efforts.

## CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Paul Carell and Guenter Boedekker, Die Gefangenen, (1980): 249.

<sup>2</sup>By various accounts, the Germans executed at least 140,000 Soviet PWs, and maybe as many as 473,000. Of the more than 5 million Soviet PWs in German custody, 2.4 million Soviets died or were executed while in custody. The following notes (#3 on Streim and #4 on Bailey) provide the references to these statements.

<sup>3</sup>Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung Sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa." (1981): 244.

<sup>4</sup>Ronald H. Bailey, Prisoners of War, (1981): 14.

<sup>5</sup>Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, (1978): 109.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology employed in examining the interrogation process. Major elements of the methodology are the literature search, definitions, comparison of the World War II U.S. and German operations, examination of interrogation reports, and comparison of historical lessons to current AirLand Battle interrogation doctrine.

#### Literature Search

The literature search for the historical aspect of the study focused upon the doctrine and employment of that doctrine for the World War II U.S. and German armies, principally in the European and Russian theaters of war, respectively. It included a general research effort to understand the overall intelligence system of both armies during the war, in order to see how interrogation fit into those systems. It also included research to find the records of interrogation operations of one or more divisions and their associated corps. The specific units researched appear on the worksheet for examination of reports, discussed below.

Literature search on the German army enabled the author to discover records of the associated army, army group, and high command intelligence staff for the same period. The author made an assumption in identifying the

interrogation reports of the German V Army Corps; Chapter 5, Analysis of World War II Interrogation, discusses this assumption under the V Army Corps section.

The AirLand Battle literature search confines itself to published doctrine concerning intelligence operations overall, and specifically to interrogation operations. Information on current practice, such as authorized interrogators in military intelligence units, represent present day figures; these of course are subject to change.

#### Definitions

Chapter One included several definitions. For the purpose of the methodology, other aspects of the study also require definition.

##### The Interrogation System

The intelligence system of an army is complex. In order that there be no misunderstanding, this study limits itself to a specific system of interrogation, defined here:

The interrogation system: A system employing questioners to elicit and obtain historical, current, and predictive information (defined below) from prisoners of war and civilians (noncombatant and other) in an area of combat operations, in order to determine enemy identification, location, strength, and capabilities or intentions. This system spans tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The system examined in this study stretches from actions at point of capture to the provision of information



to a potential user, e.g., a G2 or G3, but does not judge the G2 or G3 in the use of the information. The study will discuss the relative timeliness of the information by examining the historical, current, or predictive nature of the interrogations, as well as the provision of information to higher or lower headquarters for potential use.

#### Timeliness

For the purpose of this study, timeliness requires definition. There are three timeliness categories: historical, current, and predictive. Definitions of these categories follow.

"Historical" information is the category for events that occurred more than twenty-four hours earlier than the time or date of interrogation. As an example, a soldier interrogated three days after capture would provide almost solely historical information, unless he knew of information or intentions concerning the future.

"Current" information is the category for events that occurred within the last twenty-four hours (relative to the time and date of interrogation). Examples are information on strength, locations, and present missions of enemy units.

"Predictive" information in this study refers to events that will occur in the next 24 hours (or more), (relative to the time and date of interrogation.) An example is an intent to attack.

### Comparison of World War II Operations

In analyzing World War II U.S. and German interrogation operations it will be useful to compare:

a. What the U.S. and Germans did alike in World War II;

b. What they did differently due to some specific situation;

c. What they determined to be their own strengths and shortcomings;

d. Interrogation reports, or summaries thereof, to determine information targetted, results achieved, and the relative timeliness of the interrogation.

By analyzing the doctrine, practice, and some samples of actual reports, the study forms a basis of historical lessons. These historical lessons are in turn the basis for comparing historical operations with present-day doctrine. In this analysis, the German experience is valuable because the Germans interrogated Soviet prisoners of war, a possibility for future U.S. AirLand Battle operations.

The comparison of doctrine and organization for interrogation at different echelons determines the interrogation focus of each echelon and the relative importance of interrogation to each army. In order to venture beyond the doctrine, this study will examine samples of actual interrogation reports.

### Examination of Interrogation Reports

The examination of individual reports, or summaries thereof, provides the actual practice in the field, rather than just the doctrine promulgated in contemporary regulations or provided in postwar treatments of the subject. The results of the examination tell us that interrogation at certain levels provided the capturing army certain results, targetted certain types of information, and provided it as past, present, or future information.

The purpose of the examination is to sample the product of interrogation at different organization levels. The examination provided the type of information produced by interrogation, and the "relative time" of that information. The discussion of the method employed will clarify these factors of type of information and "relative time."

#### Method of Examination

The author examined eight samples of interrogation reports. For seven of them the author used a form designed for the purpose. The form did not accomodate one sample of reports, those by the U.S. Military Intelligence Service Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No.1. The latter sample underwent a more subjective examination, which is explained in Chapter 5 but which is very similar to the process explained here.

The accompanying figure (Figure 1) shows a sheet developed for examining interrogation reports. Since the

German records are on microfilm, the form contains a reference to the microfilm series, roll, and frame at the very top. The next information at the top of the report is a list of the interrogating units selected for sampling in this study, for checking off when examining reports. A brief review of the interrogating units is in order in light of the abbreviations not familiar to the reader.

German units listed are:

- a. The 5th Panzer (armored) Division.
- b. The 3d Infantry Division (Motorized).
- c. The V Armeekorps (V Army Corps).
- d. DULAG 230 (The transient PW camp, or Durchgangslager, probably operated by 4th Panzer Army).

American units listed are:

- a. 415th Infantry Regiment.
- b. 8th Infantry Division.
- c. VII Corps.
- d. MFIU (Mobile Field Interrogation Unit operated by the Field Interrogation Detachment of the Military Intelligence Service, ETO).

Following interrogating unit listings, there is a place for recording the name and unit of the prisoner, and date of interrogation report.

The matrix on the form provides a list of interrogation subjects and the echelons to which the subjects refer. The left hand side comprises some likely interrogation subjects concerning the unit, its location,

T-\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (Series/roll/frame)  
 5. PANZER DIV V ARMEEKORPS 415th INF REGT VII CORPS  
 3. INF DIV (MOT.) DULAG 230 8th INF DIV MFIU

NAME		UNIT						DATE OF REPORT		
ITEM REPORTED	PLT	CO	BN	REGT	BDE	DIV	CORPS	ARMY	OTHER	
UNIT ID										
FPN										
PERSONALIA										
UNIT SUBORD										
MORALE										
LOCATION										
CREW WPNS										
ARTY										
RESERVES										
STRAT RES										
ADJ UNITS										
BOUNDARIES										
CMD POST										
LOGISTICS										
AIR DISPERS										
STRENGTH										
PERSONNEL										
REPLACEMENTS										
AMMO										
FOOD										
FUEL										
TANKS										
TRUCKS										
MG'S										
MORTARS										
ARTY										
MATL LOSSES										
MEN LOSSES										
MISSION										
DEFEND										
ATTACK										
TIME OF ATK										
WITHDRAW										
OTHER										
TOTAL ANSWERS										
TOTAL HISTORICAL										
TOTAL CURRENT										
TOTAL PREDICTIVE										

Figure 1. Report Analysis Form

strength, and mission. Spaces left on the form allow the addition of other topics encountered. Across the top, from platoon to army, are the echelons potentially discussed in the interrogation report, with a final column, "Other," to address information that is not specific to an echelon, or information that does not fit into echelon categories.

The author examined interrogation reports and summaries of interrogation reports (found in periodic intelligence reports and order of battle notes) where original reports were not available. Most of the reports did not reference only one prisoner, but often grouped prisoners by unit. Because of this, the author applied some discretion in the examination of interrogation reports or summaries. Where possible, an examination form was completed on each report. Where the report contained information on prisoners from more than one large unit (usually of brigade, regiment, or division size), a separate form was completed concerning each unit, group of prisoners, and date on the report. In the case of German interrogation reports, the author completed some forms on separate airborne battalions of brigade-sized units opposing the German V Army Corps, as these units operated in isolation behind the German lines.

Report examination included identification data, as discussed, an examination of the type of information given by the prisoner (by subject and by echelon, as explained),

as well as an examination of the "relative time" of the information provided.

In order to determine the "relative time" of the information in this study, the author first compares the time of interrogation to the time of capture (this is sometimes unknown to the reader of the report). With this information, the author then determines whether the information resulting from an interrogation was historical, current, or predictive information, in relation to the time of the interrogation.

Accordingly, during the examination the author marked each information item given in the appropriate row and column (type of information and respective echelon), and marked the form with an "H" for historical data, a "C" for current data, or a "P" for predictive data. During the examination, a new category, "Unknown," designated by a "U" on the form, was added. This category accounted for questions obviously asked by interrogators to which the prisoner replied that he did not know the information. This occurred infrequently. The significance of unknown information was that it was a concern of the interrogating echelon, i.e., an intelligence requirement about use of gas warfare, location of minefields, or similar information.

Subjective decisions played an important role in determining timeliness factors in reports sampled. Because all interrogation reports sampled did not provide the definitive time of capture or of interrogation, the author

made subjective decisions about the timeliness factor where necessary. As an example, an interrogation report may not have stated the date of capture, but may have contained information on the strength of a unit. In this case, the author marked the item as "current." In this regard, all unit numerical designations were "current" unless the report stipulated that the unit had undergone redesignation or reorganization in the past.

#### Analysis

Once all the reports for each unit had undergone examination, the author tallied the results on one form for each division, regiment, or other echelon examined, adding those types of information that did not fit in established categories on the left side of the form. The summary contained the frequency of information by type, by echelon, and by relative time. For example, the summary indicated how many times a regimental level unit identification or the personnel strength of a battalion level unit occurred in the sample of interrogation reports or summaries examined, and how many times the information given was either current, historical, or predictive.

The next step involved ranking the types of information by frequency of occurrence, noting in which echelon(s) the bulk of the information fell. The averaging of the number of historical, current, and predictive entries provided a percentage of historical, current, and predictive



information about the sample. With these steps done, the author developed conclusions from the sample.

The conclusions concern the types of information predominant and most frequently produced in the sample, the target echelons concerned, and the relative timeliness. Other types of conclusions concerned intelligence requirements evident in the sample, and conclusions based upon the tactical or strategic situation.

#### Results of Report Examination

The study sampled reports from a U.S. regiment, divisions and corps of both armies, a German field army PW camp, and a U.S. theater level interrogation unit. The results of the examination show how alike or how different U.S. and German interrogation operations were at division and corps level. These differences or similarities include:

- a. The types of information gathered, and the predominant target echelon;
- b. The "relative time" focus by each army: i.e., how much of the interrogation-derived information was historical, current, or predictive as defined above.
- c. The frequency of results by type and echelon; i.e., what a collection manager could expect by using interrogation at different levels to collect information.

#### Conclusions of the Historical-Based Comparison

The comparison of doctrine and practice, taken with the results of examining original interrogation reports and

summaries, provides a picture of similarities, differences, strengths, shortcomings, and expectations of the product of interrogation.

Prior to comparing these conclusions to the doctrine for interrogation operations under AirLand Battle, the study considered factors that were unique to World War II.

#### Comparison of Historical and Modern Operations

Given the historical basis for interrogation organization and operations in World War II, this study then compares the results with those of AirLand Battle doctrine. In order to do so, the study examines those things which may have changed since World War II.

This first step delineates the implications of AirLand Battle doctrine which may affect interrogation operations in a mid-intensity environment. Examples are increased mobility of all forces, improved communications equipment, increased threats, etc. These implications may color the comparison.

Next, the study compares AirLand Battle doctrine to the historical lessons, seeking the similarities and differences. For instance, if there are World War II lessons which current doctrine ignores or discounts, and which appear unaffected by the implications of AirLand Battle, then a problem may exist. In another instance, if modern doctrine contradicts the common experience of World War II, then it appears, unless so explained, that the

doctrine has no basis in historical experience, at least from World War II.

The results of this comparison include:

a. Validation of current doctrine where such doctrine agrees with historical lessons.

b. Indications that historical lessons underwent adaptation in order to meet the modern doctrine. This may be due to either World War II-unique factors or new implications, such as of those of the AirLand Battlefield, or experience in the Korean or Vietnam Wars.

c. Determination of problem areas where doctrine disagrees with the historical lessons with no apparent reason.

## CHAPTER 4

### U.S. AND GERMAN ARMY WORLD WAR II INTERROGATION

This chapter describes in detail the interrogation operations of the German Army and the U.S. Army in World War II. In this chapter we see the changes in interrogation doctrine on both sides during the war, which moved the focus of the effort toward the frontlines. We also see the organization for interrogation reaching from frontline units (usually at regiment) back to theater headquarters and beyond. On both sides there is involvement of, and support to, sister services and governmental agencies at higher levels.

#### German World War II Interrogation Operations

An adequate discussion of the German interrogations operations calls for a description of doctrine and actions taken at each level within the chain stretching from the point of capture to the highest authority concerned with interrogation in the Army. In so doing it is appropriate to examine the interrogation structure at each level.

#### German Doctrine for Interrogation

German army interrogation doctrine as prescribed by the 1941 army regulation (Heeresdienstvorschrift) 89 is brief, less than one page of the pocketbook-sized text. The doctrine provides that all troop units and the division headquarters may interrogate a prisoner only briefly concerning the immediate situation, and then send the

prisoner to the corps or army collection point as quickly as possible. At the collection point, officers and interpreters sent forward by the army Ic (G2) would accomplish the interrogation. In the case of a great number of prisoners, units should select some prisoners and send them to the rear expediently on returning empty vehicles. The regulation also suggests that the questioning of inhabitants of an area is occasionally of worth.

Corps interrogations were likewise to be brief, concerning only the corps situation. Definitive interrogation, using an officer and interpreter, was the province of the army. At the Durchgangslager, abbreviated Dulag, meaning transient camp (run either by the army or by the Quartermaster in the rear), there was a supplemental interrogation.<sup>1</sup>

#### Changes to Structure

This interrogation structure changed during the war, notably "about November 1941" for several reasons. First was the change from more dynamic war to static or positional war in the Soviet Union. Second was the delay in reporting results of interrogations to higher levels, as experienced in Poland. Additionally, as David Kahn says,

During the war, the Germans learned and relearned the value of promptness in interrogation, and as more interpreters became available, interrogation expanded downward, closer to the battlefield."<sup>2</sup>

German sources of information, predominantly historical studies completed after the war by German

officers, discuss mostly the experience with Soviet prisoners of war. This is perhaps because German handling of Soviets was of greater interest to Americans when these Germans prepared studies at American direction. Perhaps the Americans also considered that the Germans would not write objectively about the handling of American prisoners. Regardless of the reason, the interrogation of Soviet prisoners by the Germans is of interest here in any case.

German writing (including that translated into English) on these topics seems to use the term "interpreter" (in German Dolmetscher) instead of "interrogator," but the texts suggest that interrogating prisoners was a function of the "interpreter." One source indicates that the best interpreters interrogated prisoners, but also exploited captured documents. This study uses the word "interpreter" as the Germans did.<sup>3</sup>

#### From Point of Capture Through Regimental Level

Upon capture the Germans took a prisoner of war to company level. There the capturing unit reviewed all of the prisoner's documents (theoretically, at least), such as his "paybook, passes, papers, and map." (Note that the Soviets considered maps classified documents). From these documents, and perhaps some questions, the company determined the prisoner's unit, and reported it to battalion.<sup>4</sup>

An example illustrates this procedure. A German unit, possibly the 11th Panzer Division, captured then-First

Lieutenant Clayton G. Metcalf of the 137th Infantry Regiment, 35th Infantry Division, on 13 September 1944. Metcalf noted in his book that the German platoon leader or company commander interrogated him briefly in broken English. Metcalf also notes that the "next higher unit", which had a staff, also interrogated him. Though he did not know the size of the unit, it could have been a battalion or regiment.\*

At battalion the prisoner, accompanied by all of his documents, underwent a quick interrogation if possible. The battalion kept no written record of this interrogation. Battalions had interest in, and interrogated on, subjects such as opposing company sectors, strength, guards, locations of company through regimental command posts, positions of artillery, machine guns and antitank weapons, wire and minefield obstacles, the presence of armor, and the activities of the last day, if a linguist was available.

Postwar accounts conflict on the fact of a linguist at battalion level. One source claims that one interpreter (generally of poor quality) was present at battalion. Further, after November, 1941 the Germans, through training, attempted to provide a better qualified interpreter at battalion level. They never fully achieved this goal.\*

At the regimental level, the Germans interrogated the prisoner in a manner similar to that at battalion level,

but focusing on information of interest to the regiment. There was an interpreter at regiment, as well as a "special mission staff officer," who guided the interpreter in conducting interrogations. Regiments did not have Ic (or "S2") staff officers.<sup>7</sup>

After November 1941, German Army High Command directives required an "intermediate interrogation" at the regiment. This change occurred due to the change to "position warfare," and probably from the intent to capitalize on the promptness of interrogation (as noted) and the shock of capture. Ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of Russian prisoners talked. This may have been due to the shock of capture. In order to provide prompt reporting, the Germans used telephonic reports and motorcycle-equipped interpreters who interrogated at regiment and personally informed the division Ic (G2) of their results, receiving "division experiences" (presumably both in the tactical situation and in interrogation, but not better defined) in return.<sup>8</sup>

In a study written after the war, German staff officers make a distinction in terminology between the more simple interrogation at battalion and regimental levels, and the more thorough interrogation done at division and above. These officers term the interrogation at battalion and regimental levels as Befragung, and that at division and above as Vernehmung. Both words have the meaning of interrogation, but Vernehmung (division and higher) has an



additional meaning of examination, connoting more detailed questioning than does Befragung (battalion and regiment).<sup>9</sup>

#### Division and Higher Level Interrogation

The division, the lowest echelon with a specialized intelligence staff officer and a small staff including one or two interpreters, was the scene of the first systematic interrogation of a prisoner. In contrast to the 1941 regulation cited above, the Germans apparently did not always limit themselves to the quick, immediate battlefield-oriented interrogation. One postwar study said that the division interrogation could provide a "picture of the enemy not only on the Division and Corps Front, but also far to the rear" given a "capable G2 and a capable interpreter."

At division level, the Ic (G2) himself, or his assistant (designated as the Ordonanzoffizier 3, or "O3"), or the interpreters themselves interrogated PWs. Unless there were many PWs, each received a thorough interrogation, one at a time, in a room at division headquarters.<sup>10</sup>

Division interrogations focused on order of battle, using simple prose formats until early 1942, when the Army High Command published detailed interrogation forms, including some questionnaires printed in German and Russian for use on the Eastern Front. Typical questions (and answers) included unit identification, location of command posts, mission, strength, personnel losses, morale, number and types of heavy weapons (machineguns through artillery),

minefields and other obstacles, gas warfare intentions, and routes used by units to come to the front.<sup>12</sup>

After the summer of 1942, with changes emphasizing battalion and regimental interrogation, the Army High Command (OKH) intelligence staff section known as Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East), took a more active role in periodically assigning interrogation intelligence requirements to lower command levels. These requirements were in the form of questionnaires. These questionnaires extended beyond frontline combat and rear areas, and sought information on home life, induction, training, and combat activity. These requirements reflected gaps in Army High Command knowledge based on collection from other sources as well as interrogation. Other offices outside the army, such as the government Economics or Scientific Offices, also sent along requirements critical to their own studies of the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup>

The German Army's handling of PWs of course affected their interrogation. Interrogators had to be where the prisoners were kept, or else made arrangements to conduct prisoners to headquarters, such as at regiment or division levels (or higher). At these headquarters, the intelligence staff officer or one of his assistants could interrogate using an interpreter. There was no intelligence staff officer at regiment; instead the commander may have assigned a staff officer the duty of interrogating prisoners.

From division collecting points (Sammelstelle), PWs went to the Durchgangslager or Dulag, the army transient camp, bypassing the corps. Only important prisoners (staff officers, higher-ranking officers, specialists) went through the corps, for the purpose of interrogation. After the Dulag interrogation the prisoner went on to a permanent camp called a Stammlager, abbreviated Stalag.<sup>13</sup>

As a result of these procedures corps interrogation was the exception, not the rule. Division sent a copy of all interrogation reports to the corps, as well as to army, army group, and Fremde Heere Ost, and provided two periodic reports to Corps daily, e.g., at 0530 and 1600 hours. Further, the division immediately passed along important information, such as the identification of new units or changes in enemy tactics, via telephone.<sup>14</sup>

Types of prisoners that corps interrogated included higher-ranking officers, courier officers from unit staffs, officers reduced to the ranks for some offense, men from industry sent to the army due to some offense or "a change of status," and members of the NKVD (Soviet secret police). These prisoners stopped at corps only briefly en route to army, army group, and Fremde Heere Ost, with their documents.<sup>15</sup>

The field army had a larger intelligence staff than the corps, including a subsection of the Ic (G2) which was responsible for interrogation and production of interrogation reports. At army, the Ic himself frequently

interrogated special cases such as general officers, general staff officers, or officers from higher staff with documents, and often called in specialists from other staffs when specialist prisoners were available.<sup>16</sup>

Normally there were two to four interpreters at the army level. These interrogators usually worked at the Dulag.<sup>17</sup>

According to one source, reliability of interrogation at field army was about 90 percent, compared to some 80 percent at division. This difference was due to both the availability of better linguists as interpreters, as well as the more detailed information that the army could bring to bear in questioning prisoners. While not mentioned in the postwar analysis, the field army probably had more time to interrogate PW, which would have tended to raise the reliability of interrogation.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, the shock of capture had probably passed by the time the PW arrived at the Dulag. The prisoner by this time realized that the Germans were not going to kill him. The prisoner therefore may not have had the same motivation (that is, to save his life by responding to questioning) as when confronted with that prospect soon after capture. As a result, the PW may have had sound motivation to tell the truth.

At the next higher echelon, the army group, there was little interrogation, except for those prisoners of special importance, described above. Here also other

offices such as the Field Economics office, the SS (Schutzstaffel), or air force, artillery, or armor specialists often took part in interrogations of specialists. The army group received daily teletype excerpts of interrogations from army. The real task of the army group as concerns interrogation was the evaluation of prisoner interrogation reports. The army group intelligence staff compared the results of interrogation (and other collection sources) to extensive files kept on enemy units. This process helped to determine enemy operational level intentions and to counter Soviet deception.<sup>19</sup>

At Army High Command level, Fremde Heere Ost received interrogation reports from lower levels (including those from division) and interrogated important prisoners in its own camp. Group III of Fremde Heere Ost was the "interpreter group," which, among other duties, ran an interrogation center. This camp was at Schloss Boyen (Castle Boyen) near Lötzen, East Prussia (now known as Głazyko, Poland), and near Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg, East Prussia. The camp later moved to Luckenwalde, near Berlin. As an indication of the center's size and activity, in December 1944, the 8 German and 19 Russian interpreters conducted 63 interrogations.<sup>20</sup>

One author characterizes the strengths of Foreign Armies East thus:

An artful system of evaluation of captured materiel and interrogation of prisoners of war...[there was] no unit, general, weapon that

didn't come to the knowledge of (Foreign Armies East Chief) Gehlen's people...every Soviet general, every Red Army commander from brigade commander upwards, every general staff chief from corps level was in Fremde Heere Ost card files.<sup>21</sup>

Fremde Heere Ost also had its intelligence failures, to include the Soviet Stalingrad offensive, the quick Soviet offensive after Kursk in the summer of 1943, and the failure to detect the Soviet offensive against Army Group Center in the summer of 1944.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the structure described, there is mention of interrogation teams that travelled to frontline areas where many prisoners were likely to appear. While there is evidence of such teams on the western front, e.g., "Kommando Fritz," there is no specific mention of their use against the Soviets.<sup>23</sup>

In summary, German Army tactical interrogation doctrine changed during the war, extending the effort toward the frontlines. This change emphasized regimental and, where possible, battalion level interrogation, in addition to the the first systematic interrogation at division. Corps interrogated only selected prisoners, as did the field army. Army group intelligence staffs analyzed interrogation information, and conducted some interrogation. The army group was the first level where direct German Air Force, SS, and governmental office participation occurred in the interrogation process. The Army High Command level conducted strategic interrogations in support of army and governmental offices. There was no

specific mention of combined interrogation operations with any Axis allies.

#### U.S. Army World War II Interrogation Operations

The discussion of U.S. interrogation operations will include a section on doctrine, based on two field manuals (and a change to one) used during the war, and then a discussion of the actual practice.

#### U.S. Army Doctrine for Interrogation

Field Manual (FM) 30-15 contained the doctrine for interrogation operations. During World War II, there were two versions of FM 30-15, one dated 22 July 1940, the other dated 7 December 1943, and "Change No. 1" dated 15 July 1944.

Generally speaking, the effects of the doctrine changes were to push interrogation down toward the battlefield from division to regimental level. The 1940 version of FM 30-15 focused interrogation at the division level, while allowing for "brief examination" at regimental and battalion levels. In the 1943 version, the effort expands more on the regimental level, and notes that an interrogation team (emphasis added) rather than just an "enlisted interpreter" (as in the 1940 version) is appropriate at infantry regiment, (as well as at division and higher headquarters.) The 1943 version also allows for the assignment of such interrogation teams at battalion level. These actions, taken in combination, appear to decentralize interrogation assets to lower echelons.<sup>24</sup>

The essence of the doctrine was that interrogation (or "examination" as contemporary doctrine described it) occurred in two phases: one tactical and one strategic phase. The tactical phase extended from battalion to corps levels. The strategic phase occurred at field army or higher levels. Each echelon of command was to examine PWs only on subjects of immediate interest to the command concerned. The reasons for this were to expedite PWs to the rear and to simplify interrogation at each echelon.

In 1943, specific mention of the focus of phase one (or tactical) interrogation at regimental headquarters represents a change from earlier doctrine. Further, doctrine stipulated that battalions could examine prisoners only if interrogation teams were present. Otherwise, battalions could only examine prisoners in an emergency, and then only if "unit intelligence personnel" did so. This doctrine also provided that interrogation teams at division, corps, or army could go forward to lower levels in order to expedite information.<sup>29</sup>

These changes have two possible and complementary meanings. First, the changes represent a trend toward interrogation further forward. While the reasons for this are not explicit in the manual, it is reasonable to assume that the changes have to do with increasing promptness of information by early access to the prisoner, and timely exploitation of the shock of capture in persuading a prisoner to talk. Second, the changes imply that by 1943



the Army had determined that the interrogation process was relatively complex and specialized to the extent that only properly trained persons should perform it. While the manual does not say so, a reasonable assumption is that wartime experience influenced the changes made.

First phase interrogation focused at regiment and division level for information important to each. The corps also needed information but did not examine every prisoner, however. Instead, the corps relied on two means of securing interrogation information to meet its own interests. First, the corps could direct interrogation of prisoner of war teams at division to send PWs of interest to corps (presumably the corps would set certain qualifications) to the corps PW cage. Second, the corps could send interrogators to division collection points to examine prisoners there.<sup>26</sup>

The second phase encompassed interrogation of a strategic or general nature on military or economic subjects. Second phase interrogation occurred usually at field army or theater headquarters, or the "Central PW Inclosure," (sic) (which could be either at army or theater level).<sup>27</sup>

The field army PW Enclosure (sic) was the location of the "final examination" of prisoners in the Army's area. Doctrinally, the field army PW Enclosure received prisoners directly from the division collection points or corps enclosures.<sup>28</sup>

At theater level, the Central PW Enclosure [sic] conducted the "final examination" in the theater. As at the Army enclosure, the theater enclosure examination focused on the "general organization of enemy forces, not tactical organization" including such things as "projected operations...essential information...[and] conditions in the hostile army or country."<sup>29</sup>

#### From Point of Capture through Regimental Level

Given the doctrine discussed above, the reality of interrogation operations was, in practice, somewhat different. A capturing unit would often ask a prisoner a few questions, if the unit had a foreign language speaking soldier, or if the prisoner spoke English. Typical questions included unit identification, and location of front lines and machine guns.<sup>30</sup>

Battalions often quizzed a prisoner, and sometimes even had an interrogation team, perhaps two lieutenants and four enlisted men or noncommissioned officers, which came down from regiment. Questions to prisoners usually concerned the immediate tactical situation.<sup>31</sup>

At regiment, where later in the war there were interrogation teams, a more lengthy interrogation ensued. The interrogation team at full strength consisted of two officers and four enlisted or noncommissioned officer members. As noted, interrogators examined prisoners on information of immediate tactical value to the regiment,

such as crew-served weapons locations, reserves, minefields and other obstacles, etc.<sup>22</sup>

#### Division and Higher Level Interrogation

Doctrinally the basis of assignment of interrogation teams was one per division. The team consisted usually of two officer interrogators (captain and lieutenant), a master sergeant interrogator, a staff sergeant document analyst, one enlisted clerk and one driver. In practice, divisions usually had two such teams.<sup>23</sup>

The Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW) teams belonged to the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) headquarters in the European Theater of Operations, and were only attachments to the divisions or corps, etc. The MIS also attached Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) teams to divisions on the basis of one six-man team per division. While the MII teams did not interrogate prisoners per se, they were able to assist with and perform other language duties, including interrogation and document exploitation of civilian sources. This at least took the burden of some language duties away from the IPW teams.<sup>24</sup>

In practice there were often three six-man IPW teams at each corps. A corps also received two six-man MII teams. Corps focused its interrogation requirements on prisoners judged important or knowledgeable in completing the "first phase" interrogations. 12th Army Group's corps found it necessary to frequently brief the IPW team; usually

the corps G2 briefed an IPW team member daily on the current situation and essential intelligence requirements.<sup>35</sup>

At the next higher echelon, the field army, there were four six-man IPW teams and three MII teams. Doctrinally, the army level teams conducted the second phase, or strategic, interrogation.<sup>36</sup>

There were no IPW teams at the Army Group level. MIS attached two six-man MII teams to each Army Group. 12th Army Group did use intelligence from PW interrogation in developing intelligence summaries.<sup>37</sup>

#### Military Intelligence Service

At theater level, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) performed operational and command functions for U.S. interrogation (and other) intelligence units in theater. MIS was subordinate to the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, ETO, supervised its operations. MIS also operated several interrogation units aside from IPW and MII teams assigned to field army and lower levels.<sup>38</sup>

One MIS interrogation unit, the Field Interrogation Detachment, included Mobile Field Interrogation Units and a Documents Section. The mobile units apparently located at PW enclosures or collecting points to get strategic information quickly by their forward positioning.<sup>39</sup>

The MIS 6824th Detailed Interrogation Center operated in France and focused on strategic intelligence. Examples of subjects covered include

technical, economic, transportation, industrial, political, and medical intelligence, as well as the enemy country's high command, organization for espionage and counterespionage, dissidents, and policy on and operations in occupied countries. Based on the subject matter and high degree of interest in this center, technical and other specialists provided interrogators with intelligence requirements.<sup>40</sup>

#### Combined Interrogation Operations

In addition to U.S.-only operations, the U.S. and British operated the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC) in Wilton Park, England. CSDIC was subordinate to Allied Forces Headquarters. Its American Section, in addition to strategic and technical interrogation of important or specialist PW, also screened PW with "long term" strategic or technical information and processed such PW directly through to the interrogation center in Fort Hunt, Virginia.<sup>41</sup>

#### Strategic Interrogation in the United States

The War Department G2 Section operated a strategic interrogation center at Fort Hunt, Virginia for European Theater PW. Essentially, Fort Hunt was a center at which selected PW coming in from Europe underwent interrogation on technical and strategic matters (as discussed above). The center at Fort Hunt was a joint operation, with U.S. Army and U.S. Navy participation. Fort Hunt sent screening teams to ports at Newport News, Brooklyn, and Boston to select PWs

for interrogation, in addition to the referrals from the other detailed interrogation centers.<sup>42</sup>

The foregoing shows that U.S. Army interrogation operations in World War II stretched from the front lines back to the United States. Particular emphasis on tactical interrogation occurred at division, and, later in the war, at regiment, as doctrine changed to shift the emphasis forward. Strategic interrogation occurred at army and higher levels. The Military Intelligence Service assigned IPW and MII teams to army and lower levels, and operated a number of interrogation centers at theater level. MIS also participated in a combined effort with the British in England. The Fort Hunt Interrogation center was a joint operation with the U.S. Navy.

#### Summary

In summary, Both U.S. and German Army doctrine changed during World War II. Both armies decentralized or extended their interrogation operations toward the battlefield. Both also had interrogation functions supporting the highest levels of the army, sister services, and the national government. The U.S. participated in combined interrogation operations with the British.

#### CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Oberkommando des Heeres [Army High Command], Heeres Dienstvorschrift geheim 89 [Secret Army Regulation 89], Fremde Heere West III [Foreign Armies West III], (1941): 21-22, 40-41. Hereafter referenced as OKH H.Dv. 89.

<sup>2</sup>Alfred Toppe, "German Methods of Interrogating Prisoners of War in World War II," U.S. European Command Historical Division MS# P-018a, (1949): 28. Hereafter cited as Toppe, MS# P-018a. Rudolf Langhäuser, "German General Staff," Volume XIII, English Copy, U.S. Army Europe Historical Division MS# P-031b, (1950): 41. Hereafter cited as Langhäuser, MS# P-031b. David Kahn, Hitler's Spies, (1985): 144.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. War Department, "German Operational Intelligence," (1946): 112. In U.S. accounts of the period, the terms "interrogator" and "interpreter" have separate meanings. Hereafter cited as "German Operational Intelligence."

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Forces European Theater Interrogation Center, "First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report: The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (1c Dienst Ost)," (1945): 153-154. Hereafter cited as USFETIC, "German G-2 Service." There is no mention of official interpreters or interrogators at company level; no doubt any soldiers present who could speak the prisoner's language might have asked a few questions.

<sup>5</sup>Clayton G. Metcalf, Kriegsgefangenen, (1965): 1, 3-9.

<sup>6</sup>"German Operational Intelligence:" 3. USFETIC "German G-2 Service:" 154. This source makes no mention of an interpreter at battalion level, rather says "if available." Toppe, MS# P-018a: 20, 24, 28 cites goal of interpreters at battalion after Nov 1941.

<sup>7</sup>USFETIC "German G-2 Service:" 154. Toppe, MS# P-018a: 20. Toppe does not identify the "special mission staff officer" at regiment.

<sup>8</sup>Toppe, MS# P-018a, p. 28, and Langhäuser, MS# P-031b, p. 42, both refer to motorcycles. No other mention of motorcycles made in any other account researched; use of the telephone for prompt reporting receives greater emphasis instead. Toppe refers to "division experiences," but does not clarify whether these are situational or interrogation oriented.

<sup>9</sup>Generalmajor Rudolf Langhäuser, "Studie über die Beschaffung von Feindnachrichten im deutschen Heer während des 2. Weltkrieges an der Ostfront" [Study concerning the collection of Enemy Intelligence in the German Army during the Second World War on the Eastern Front], (1954): 52. Hereafter referred to as Langhäuser, Studie.

<sup>10</sup>"German Operational Intelligence:" 57. USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 153-154; quote p. 153. Kahn, Hitler's Spies: 144.

<sup>11</sup>Kahn discusses the questionnaires and categories of results in Hitler's Spies, p. 145. Copies of the Army High Command (OKH) interrogation forms and directives through command channels for their use, as well as Russian/German questionnaires, are in the National Archive microfilm collection of captured German records, series T-314, roll 252, starting at frame 1132. This roll also contains several completed interrogation forms. Microfilm referenced hereafter as NA microfilm T-#, roll #, frame #.

<sup>12</sup>Kahn, Hitler's Spies: 145. Colonel (later General) Reinhard Gehlen headed Foreign Armies East. NA microfilm T-78, roll 548, frame 514 contains a list of Fremde Heere Ost requirements sent to army groups and armies in the east from Gehlen on 25 February 1944. This list specifies that the requirements are also "for use in interrogation of prisoners of war with above average knowledge of the operations area." Further, the list states "...these PW should also be sent to the Fremde Heere Ost interrogation camp in Loetzen [East Prussia, now in Poland]." "German Operational Intelligence" discusses on p. 93 the non-Army requirements, using Fremde Heere West [Foreign Armies West] as an example; the same probably held true for Fremde Heere Ost.

<sup>13</sup>For a discussion of regiment practices, see Toppe, MS# P-018a, p.20, and endnote #7 above. For PW handling, see USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 154, and OKH H.Dv. 89: 40-41.

<sup>14</sup>USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 161. "German Operational Intelligence:" 3.

<sup>15</sup>USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 157. Kahn, Hitler's Spies: 148. Neither source gives a specific grade which corresponds to "higher-ranking officers" that a corps might interrogate. Presumably the corps or division interrogators screened officer prisoners of possible interest to the corps, and then sent them to the corps for interrogation.

<sup>16</sup>"German Operational Intelligence:" 68-69. USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 127. The officer in charge of the interrogating team normally had a telephone link to the



Ic. The team itself located near the army headquarters. Presumably the team worked in or near the Dulag; this is not clear.

<sup>17</sup>USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 128. Each army PW cage had an interpreter section; whether this is the team referenced as having a link to the Ic at army is not known; logically this is the case. The interpreter section at the Dulag, some two to four interpreters, interrogated according to army and Fremde Heere Ost requirements, conducted re-interrogations and "special interrogations" (probably detailed interrogations, such as of specialists in technical matters), and used the questionnaire technique "on all prisoners passing through."

<sup>18</sup>Kahn, Hitler's Spies: 148. While Kahn does not discuss it, the army probably had more time to spend on prisoners than did division.

<sup>19</sup>USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 72-73. Kahn, Hitler's Spies: 148. "German Operational Intelligence:" 3, 77.

<sup>20</sup>This camp, one with "favorable and comfortable conditions," accommodated some 80 high-ranking prisoners, including officers reduced in rank. USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 58. Gerald Reitlinger, House Built on Sand (1960): 315. Kahn, Hitler's Spies: 149.

<sup>21</sup>Heinz Hoehne, Der Krieg im Dunkeln [The War in Darkness] (1985): 446; translation and words in brackets mine. Gehlen went on to become the chief of the Federal Republic of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service after the war; part of his rise to power included his persuasive bargaining, including his turn-over of extensive Fremde Heere Ost intelligence files on the Soviet Union to the U.S. Army at the war's end.

<sup>22</sup>Hoehne, Der Krieg im Dunkeln: 448. As concerns the Kursk offensive, Gehlen had prophesied a pause of several months, but the offensive came after two weeks.

<sup>23</sup>Kahn, Hitler's Spies, p.149 discusses the Kommando Fritz under the Fremde Heere West staff. Lothar Metz, et al. "Organization and Working Methods of the Army Intelligence Division" MS# P-0411 (1953): 67.

<sup>24</sup>War Department, Basic Field Manual (FM) 30-15, Military Intelligence examination of Enemy Personnel, Repatriates, Documents, and Materiel (22 July 1940): 8-11. Hereafter all reference to this manual and its successors cited as FM 30-15, (date). FM 30-15 (December 1943): 2, 6.

<sup>25</sup>FM 30-15 (July 1940): 2-3. FM 30-15 (December 1943): 4, 10. By doctrine, only independent brigades examined PWs.

<sup>26</sup>FM 30-15 (July 1940): 10-11. Presumably the corps PW cage would not hold all PWs from all corps subordinate units, but instead was a place to hold PW captured by corps troops or in the corps rear area. As noted in the text concerning field army PW enclosure, PWs could travel straight from division (or corps) collection points to the field army PW enclosure.

<sup>27</sup>FM 30-15 (July 1940): 2-3. FM 30-15 (December 1943): 4.

<sup>28</sup>FM 30-15 (July 1940): 11.

<sup>29</sup>FM 30-15 (July 1940): 11. FM 30-15 (December 1943): 18.

<sup>30</sup>Major B.E. Prescott and Major H.H. Kilpatrick, "Private Marco Antonio, Prisoner of War," Military Review 23 (October 1943): 50. While this discusses prisoner of war operations in Italy, it is valid for a discussion of procedure in the Army. Hereafter cited as Prescott, "Private Marco Antonio."

<sup>31</sup>Prescott, "Private Marco Antonio:" 50. U.S. Army, Army Service Forces, "Infantry Operations in France and Belgium," (March 1945): 2. Hereafter cited as ASF, "Infantry Operations."

<sup>32</sup>ASF, "Infantry Operations:" 2.

<sup>33</sup>U.S. Forces European Theater, "Military Intelligence Service in the ETO," (The General Board Study #12), (undated): 25-26. Hereafter cited as USFET, "MIS in ETO." See also endnote #35 below.

<sup>34</sup>USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 26-27.

<sup>35</sup>USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 26, 32. FM 30-15 (December 1943): 10. U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations (Final After Action Report,)" Vol III, G2 Section, (undated): 138. Hereafter cited as 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations." U.S. Army, First Army, "Combat Operations Data, First Army, Europe 1944-1945" (1946) in a figure facing p. 160 agrees with these sources that in First Army there were 2 IPW teams at division, 3 at corps, and 4 at field army. U.S. Army, Third Army, "After Action Report, 1 August 44-9 May 45," Vol. II (G2 Section)(undated) p.6. agrees with First Army and USFET in IPW team assignments.

<sup>3</sup>\*USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 26.

<sup>37</sup>\*USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 26. This source does not explain why there were no IPW teams at army group level. 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 113.

<sup>38</sup>\*USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 3-4. As discussed, MIS commanded the IPW and MII (interpreter) teams, as well as Photographic Intelligence and Order of Battle teams which it also attached to divisions, corps, etc.

<sup>39</sup>\*USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 1-2, 4. First, the Military Intelligence Service Section-Y (MIS-Y) in February 1943 became the parent of the several interrogation units in the United Kingdom. Its concern was, "the long range and leisurely interrogation of selected enemy prisoners-of-war believed to possess information of tactical or strategical value." This section, along with MIS-X (responsible for training U.S. personnel in their conduct in case of capture) combined in April 1943 to form the Military Intelligence Service Detachment under the G2, ETO. MIS-Y became known as the PW section. The Field Interrogation Detachment activated in summer 1943 in the United Kingdom. It supervised the training of IPW and MII teams.

<sup>40</sup>\*USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 5. Lt. Col. Thomas C. Van Cleve, "Report on the Activities of Two Agencies of the CPM [Captured Personnel and Material] Branch, MIS [Military Intelligence Service], G-2, WDGS [War Department General Staff], (undated): 21-23. Hereafter cited as Van Cleve, "Report." Detailed Interrogation Centers such as the 6824th operated in North Africa, Italy, France, and England, and at Fort Hunt, Virginia.

<sup>41</sup>\*Van Cleve, "Report:" 1-7, 23. A. J. Barker, Prisoners of War (1975): 66.

<sup>42</sup>\*Van Cleve, "Report:" 25. This report centers on the Fort Hunt operation. It provides detailed information on the center in its 138 pages, including the number of changes in the supervisory chain between the center and the G2, War Department. A similar center at Tracy, California was for Japanese PW, but the California center is outside the scope of this study.

## CHAPTER 5

### ANALYSIS OF WORLD WAR II INTERROGATION

This chapter provides the analysis of German and U.S. interrogation report samples, compares the German and U.S. armies World War II interrogation operations, and examines factors that may have been unique to that war.

#### Examination of German Interrogation Reports

Given the discussion of doctrine and practice in the preceding chapter, this chapter reports on the examination of samples of interrogation reports by two German divisions, one German corps, and reports from a field army level interrogation team. The purpose of the examination and analysis of results is to determine the results of interrogation at different echelons in practice.

#### Situation

In order to understand the information contained in the interrogation reports, it is necessary to understand the tactical and operational level situation. In January 1942 the general disposition of the German Army Group Center was as shown on the accompanying map (Figure 2). From north to south the Germans had the 9th Army, the 4th Panzer Army, the 4th Army, and the 2d Panzer Army. Soviet formations exploited gaps between the 2d Panzer and 4th Armies, between the 4th and 4th Panzer Armies, and north of the 9th Army.<sup>1</sup>

Russian units of Sokoloff's Cavalry Corps and the 39th Army threatened the 4th Panzer Army's rear and lines of




Figure 2. Situation of Army Group Center, 25 January 1942.

communications, namely the Vyazma-Smolensk railroad and highway, from the north. Elements of the Russian 33d Army, attacking from the southeast, also threatened to cut off the 4th Panzer Army. Strong partisan forces and Soviet paratroops and air-landed troops behind the German lines added to the threat.<sup>2</sup>

German General Hellmuth Reinhardt, in a postwar study of the Soviet airborne and airlanding operations, describes the situation in the 4th Panzer Army thus:

In the meantime the German Fourth Panzer Army had started systematically to mop up its communications zone. The V Corps had received this mission on 6 February [1942]. For the purpose several divisions (5th Panzer Division, 3d Motorized Infantry Division, and later 106th Infantry Division, 15th Infantry Division, and elements of 23d Infantry Division) had been assigned to the V Corps. The Russian forces in the hinterland were gradually compressed into separate pockets by these German troops. The pockets were of varying sizes (some of them included 60 villages). The V Corps thereupon attempted to attack one pocket after the other and restore the status quo. Deep snow drifts, which required every road to be shovelled clear before even tanks could advance, delayed these measures and increased the difficulties connected with them. Nevertheless by the end of March the first large pocket west of Vyazma had been mopped up.<sup>3</sup>

The German V Corps' 5th Panzer Division and 3d Infantry Division (Motorized) operations were behind the frontlines against enemy forces, including ground troops on skis, paratroop units, and partisans in their rear.

#### 5th Panzer Division Interrogation Reports

Reports examined are from the period of 6 February 42 through 7 March 42, and represent every interrogation

report marked as 5th Panzer Division found in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (IC) official war diary for that period. The author assumed that these reports represented every interrogation during the period. During this period the 5th Panzer Division captured 172 PWs.<sup>4</sup>

While there were only twenty interrogation reports in this period, the reports often had information from groups of prisoners and on different units. Under the process explained as methodology, the author prepared a total of twenty-five examination forms on this data. Principal Soviet units targetted include the 329th Infantry Division of the 33d Army, the 214th Airborne Brigade, the 250th Airborne Regiment, and the 8th and 9th Airborne Brigades. One report involves the interrogation of a civilian railroad worker. Specific information on the findings is in appendix A.

#### Conclusions from 5th Panzer Division Reports

5th Panzer Division interrogated prisoners in its fight behind the German frontlines to protect the 4th Panzer Army's lines of communications. The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of the resulting reports are:

- a. The majority of interrogation information (almost one-third in each case) concerned Soviet strength, locations, and identifications. The one single largest item of information was unit numerical identification.

b. Fully half of the information gathered concerned the company and battalion level. Including platoon, regiment, and brigade information, division level interrogations produced 78.3 percent of the information on opposing regiment/brigade and lower levels. Again, much of this was identification data."

c. Most of the information collected was "current" under the study definition; the rest was mostly "historical," with almost no prediction of future activities. The analysis of time in the reports also provides insight into the interrogator's orientation and the prisoner's knowledge. Clearly the division interrogators had interest in the present, and in some past events, but either did not ask about, or received few answers on, future events.

d. The fact that several Soviet airborne soldiers were captured or gave up after several days in the woods, separated from their units after the jump, added to the amount of historical data. Their last meaningful information dated from several days prior to capture, indeed prior to embarkation for the jump. Many of the Soviet soldiers either had very little knowledge of events outside their own personal circumstances, or the interrogators were not successful in extracting such information. Due to the nature of capture in these cases, usually isolated men or small groups of men, the idea that the soldiers knew very little is probably more accurate. Exceptions to this



included two captured lieutenants and a radioman who deserted, all of whom provided a great deal of information, much of it current.

e. Probably because there were Soviet airborne units in combat, and since they had come from airfields to the rear, a substantial amount of information (eighteen items, ranking within the top three of specific item categories out of thirty-nine) concerned the origin airfields, number of units jumping, and the route by air (these were interrelated and therefore consolidated in the examination). All of this information was "historical," i.e., occurred more than twenty-four hours before the interrogation.

f. The fact that the Soviet units were airborne, infantry, cavalry, and partisan resulted in the collection of information on unit weapons such as machine guns, artillery, and mortars, instead of armor, antitank weapons, and minefields.

g. Based on questions asked, the Germans had intelligence requirements on Soviet chemical warfare and the route of Soviet units to the front (airborne and otherwise).

#### 3d Infantry Division (Motorized) Interrogation Reports

This section provides the results of examining twelve interrogation reports from the German 3d Infantry Division (Motorized). During the period examined, 13 February to 6 March 42, the 3d Division captured more than thirty-four prisoners."

Using the manner discussed in the methodology (Chapter 3), the author developed twenty-six examination forms from the 3d Division reports; the twelve actual reports often reflected information from groups of prisoners and concerned more than one major Soviet unit. Principal Soviet units targetted include the 113th Infantry Division, the 160th Infantry Division, the 338th Infantry Division, the 4th Airborne Corps, the 214th Airborne Brigade, and the 9th Airborne Brigade. One report concerns the interrogation of a civilian from the town of Pashoga.

These reports represent every interrogation report marked as 3d Infantry Division found in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (Ic) official war diary from the period 13 February 42 through 6 March 42. The author assumed that these represented every interrogation conducted during the period. Specific information on the findings is in appendix A.<sup>7</sup>

#### Conclusions From 3d Infantry Division Reports

Like the 5th Panzer Division, 3d Infantry Division fought behind the German frontlines to protect the 4th Panzer Army's rear area. The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of the division interrogation reports are:

a. Soviet strength, locations, and identification information dominated the interrogation results, comprising ninety percent of the sample's information items. Of that ninety percent, each category

provided about one-third. The one single largest item of information was unit numerical identification.

b. Forty-eight percent, or almost half, of the information gathered concerned the company and battalion level. Including platoon, regiment, and brigade information, division level interrogations produced eighty-three percent of the information on brigade and lower levels. As noted, much of this was identification data. Given German doctrine of speedy interrogation concerning the tactical situation, the division's orientation on brigade/regiment and lower echelons is appropriate.\*

c. Most of the information collected was "current" under the study definition; the rest was mostly "historical," with almost no prediction of future activities. As noted under the 5th Panzer Division, the division interrogators either did not ask about, or received few answers on, future events. The capture of Soviet airborne soldiers separated from their units some days previously probably also affected the amount of historical data.

d. Probably because there were Soviet airborne units in combat, and since they had come from airfields to the rear, a substantial amount of information (seventeen items, ranking within the top six of specific item categories out of thirty-nine) concerned the origin airfields, number of units jumping, and the route by air

(these were interrelated and therefore consolidated in the examination). All of this information was "historical," i.e., the events themselves occurred more than twenty-four hours before the interrogation.

e. The fact that the Soviet units were airborne, infantry, cavalry, and partisan resulted in the collection of information on unit weapons such as machine guns, artillery, and mortars, instead of armor, antitank weapons, and minefields.

f. There appeared to be some interest in the route of Soviet units to the front (airborne and otherwise). This was probably an intelligence requirement; many reports provided this information, probably because the interrogators posed the question to prisoners.

#### V Armeekorps Interrogation Reports

Reports examined are from the period of 18 to 26 February 42. These reports were in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (Ic) official war diary. The author has made an assumption in this case that the interrogation reports marked as Abt. Ic [G2 Section] are in fact interrogations performed by corps interpreters.\*

While there were only eight interrogation reports in this period, the reports often had information from groups of prisoners and on different units. Under the process explained as methodology, the author prepared a total of ten examination forms on this data. Principal Soviet units

targetted include the 4th Airborne Corps, the 329th Infantry Division of the 33d Army, the 1st Guards Cavalry Division, the 107th Tank Division, the 113th Infantry Division, the 160th Infantry Division, the 2d Guards Motorized Infantry Regiment, the 214th Airborne Brigade, and the 8th, 9th, and 10th Airborne Brigades. Specific information on the findings is in appendix A.

#### Conclusions from V Armeekorps Reports

V Armeekorps interrogated prisoners in its fight behind the German frontlines to protect the 4th Panzer Army's lines of communications. The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of the resulting reports are:

a. Identifications of units was the predominant category of information derived from interrogation. Numerical unit designations were again the largest subgroup.

b. The corps interrogation focus was largely at the regiment/brigade level, followed by battalion, division, and corps.

c. Most of the information was "current" as defined by the study. "Historical" was the next predominant category, but for the first time in sampling German reports, the "predictive" category was high, with 16 entries out of 242. These predictions centered mainly on attack objectives of the airborne brigades, and as such were valuable information for the defending German forces.

d. As in other samples, there were cases where information asked for by the interrogator is unknown to the prisoner. The reports included such information in order to show that the interrogator had asked the question(s).

e. Based on information contained in reports, including information that was "unknown" by PWs, the Germans apparently had intelligence requirements on new Soviet equipment (tanks in this case), partisan activities, and training, to include airborne training.

f. The type of information here was appropriate to a corps level based on German doctrine. (This reinforces the author's assumption that these reports are in fact corps-level reports; their markings are not proof positive.) The information started to verge on strategic level information, such as the information about the new Soviet tank (not yet at the battlefield). Clearly the corps had interest in a wide perspective, given the number of Soviet units targetted.

#### 4th Panzer Army Interrogation Reports

The next sample of reports came from army level interrogations in Durchgangslager 230 in Vyazma, the Soviet Union. Reports examined are from the period of 16 through 23 February 42. These represent interrogation reports marked as Dulag 230 found in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (Ic) official war diary. The author assumed that these reports

represented every interrogation conducted during the period.<sup>10</sup>

This sample differs from previous samples. First, the sample contains information of both a tactical and a strategic nature. Second, the interpreters clearly screened and selected the individuals interrogated: most were lieutenants, one a deserter.

While there are only four interrogation reports in this sample, the reports had information from several individual prisoners and on different units. Under the process explained as methodology, the author prepared a total of four examination forms on this data. One report was strategic in nature and thus did not meet the format used for analyzing reports used in this study. Principal Soviet units targetted include the 329th Infantry Division of the 33d Army, the 2d Guards Cavalry Division, the 250th Airborne Regiment, and the 81st Armored Car (Panzerwagen) Brigade. One report concerns the interrogation of three lieutenants, former civilian chemical or industrial engineers, about factories in the Soviet Union. Specific information on the findings is in appendix A.

#### Conclusions from 4th Panzer Army Reports

4th Panzer Army fought traditional frontline battles and battles in its rear area to protect its lines of communications. The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of the resulting reports are:

a At field army level, interrogations in the transit PW camp included mostly tactical information, with only some operational information (such as the potential targets of the Soviet airborne brigades) and some strategic information (such as factories). Based on examinations of the sample, subordinate corps received Dulag interrogation reports. In other words, field army level interrogation appeared to serve the army, the corps, and higher echelons (army group and government level included).

b. Identification of enemy units was no longer predominant in the information collected at this level. Instead, enemy strength was predominant; there was twice as much strength information than identification information in this sample.

c. "Historical" information also became predominant over "current" information at field army level. This was probably due both to field army level interests and to the time it took a prisoner to arrive at the Dulag and undergo screening and interrogation.

d. Based on analysis of information in the reports, field army level intelligence requirements probably included the status of German prisoners of war held by the Soviets, the general Soviet food situation, the number and arrival of British and U.S. tanks and instructors in Soviet units or training areas, tank armament, and factory location and production.



e. The strategic level report on factories evidenced German concern with factory production, sources of raw materials and power for the factories, and the number of workers employed. PWs interrogated for this information were lieutenants who, as civilians, had worked in or near these factories; this evidenced German screening of PW for information. Finally, the factory report referenced a requirement apparently from the German Armed Forces High Command War Economics and Munitions Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt im OKW) at the beginning of the report. This requirement indicates that the Dulag interpreters had a list of requirements from the Armed Forces High Command level.

#### Examination of U.S. Interrogation Reports and Summaries

This section concerns an examination and analysis of samples of U.S. World War II interrogation reports, or summaries of reports where original reports are not available. The author examined original reports from IPW Team #160, attached to the 415th Infantry Regiment, 104th Infantry Division; and report summaries from the G2 Periodic Reports of the 8th Infantry Division. These two divisions, 8th and 104th Infantry, were subordinate to the U.S. VII Corps, First U.S. Army, 12th Army Group in February-March 1945. The author also examined report summaries in VII Corps G2 Periodic Reports, and original reports from Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1 from March 1945.

Actual interrogation reports, except for the 415th Infantry Regiment's supporting IPW Team #160, and the MIS Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1, were most difficult to locate. Division and corps records of the time do not include actual interrogation reports in G2 annexes or Periodic Reports except in a very few cases of special interest. It is possible that some or all of the actual reports (by prisoner or group of prisoners) no longer exist.

One reason for the lack of reports may have been the exceedingly large numbers of German prisoners of war captured by the U.S. Army in early 1945. Such a volume of prisoners no doubt precluded the interrogation of more than a few. As a result, interrogators probably left few records and concentrated instead on a summary of information developed from a quick interrogation of several prisoners at division and corps level. The group of prisoners selected were probably those most willing to talk, in that the interrogators had little time to use complicated techniques.

#### Situation

An understanding of the general tactical situation will assist in understanding the results of examining reports and summaries. The accompanying map portrays the general situation.

At the conclusion of the Ardennes campaign, better known as the Battle of the Bulge, U.S. Army forces prepared for their attack on Germany. The U.S. VII Corps, part of the First U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, held positions in



early February in a relatively inactive sector on the west bank of the Roer River in Germany. The Roer River, with its several dams, offered an obstacle to attacking U.S. forces because the destruction of the dams could cause flooding in the Roer plain. The Germans destroyed the gates on one of the largest dams on 11 February 45, flooding the area downriver and presenting a tremendous obstacle for several days.

On 23 February 45, the VII Corps attacked across the Roer River en route to the Rhine River (Germany's last natural obstacle) and the industrial area of the Ruhr Valley. The day before, 22 February 45, 6,000 airplanes of Allied air forces bombed German positions and lines of communications.<sup>11</sup>

From 23 February through 7 March 45, the VII Corps seized the city of Düren, crossed the Erft Canal, and fought its way into Cologne on the Rhine River, finally clearing enemy resistance on 7 March 1945. During the period the VII Corps captured 18,000 prisoners of war.<sup>12</sup>

#### 415th Infantry Regiment Interrogation Reports

In addition to the general scenario mentioned above, it is useful to note the role of the 415th Infantry Regiment of the 104th Infantry Division in this campaign. Having been in combat almost every day since October, 1943, the 415th attacked across the Roer River on 23 February 1945, capturing 356 PWs that day alone. The 415th seized several towns in the next few days, some of them by night attacks

and battles at night. On 26 February, the VII Corps' 4th Cavalry Group passed through the 415th's lines, relieving it from the line after 116 of the last 126 days in contact with the enemy. From 27 February until 3 March 45, the 415th was in reserve of the 104th Infantry Division, its parent unit. During that time, there were thousands of German civilians "wandering aimlessly" in the division zone.

On 3 March 45, the regiment attacked east of the Erft canal, seizing two towns and 275 PWs, and coming within sight of Cologne. The regiment continued its attacks for the next two days, reaching Cologne on 5 March 45 and the Rhine on 6 March 45. On 7 March the 415th cleared its regimental zone of enemy resistance in the city of Cologne.<sup>13</sup>

IPW Team #160 supported the 415th Infantry Regiment. The author located ten interrogation reports written by the team between 23 February to 7 March 45. The reports concern groups of prisoners, and themselves reflect the capture of 1,090 PWs and 94 policemen. One report covers the interrogation of a civilian. Since the reports are written to reflect dates in the period, it is reasonable to assume that there are no other reports for this period, but this fact is not known for certain.

The author of this study developed ten examination forms, one for each report. Some parts of some reports are illegible. Major units opposing the regiment were elements of the 12th Volks grenadier Division, the 363d Volks grenadier

Division, the 23 Panzer Division, and the 9th Panzer Division. Specific information on the findings is in appendix B.<sup>14</sup>

#### Conclusions From 415th Infantry Regiment Reports

Conclusions drawn from examining a sample of regimental interrogation at the 415th Infantry Regiment during fast-moving offensive operations are:

a. Almost half of the information obtained was on unit identifications, itself the single largest category of information received. Another twenty percent each came from locations and strength information.

b. The predominant echelon in report results was the company, with 43.9 percent of all information concerning company level activities. Approximately three-fourths of the information derived from regimental interrogation (seventy-one percent) targetted the battalion, company, and platoon levels.

c. Almost all (ninety-three percent) of the information was current; the rest was mostly historical. There was almost no predictive information. As noted under analysis of the German 5th Panzer Division, this is a telling statement on the interrogator orientation and the knowledge of PWs.

d. There was a significant amount of information on German antitank weapons and minefields reported. This may have been related to regimental interest

or simply to the fact that the enemy was in defensive positions.

#### 8th Infantry Division Interrogation Reports

The general tactical situation for the period was noted above. In addition, some explanation of the 8th Infantry Division's operations will assist in understanding the results of examining its interrogation summaries in the G2 Periodic Reports from 23 February through 15 March 1945.

On 23 February 45, the 8th Infantry Division attacked across the Roer River. On 23 and 24 February the division battled in the city of Düren. The division cleared several towns and villages the next few days, and fought off German counterattacks, including armor and antitank weapons. On 28 February the division encountered heavy fighting in the town of Modrath. From 23 to 28 February 45, the division captured at least 1,183 prisoners of war.<sup>15</sup>

On 1 March 45 the division attacked in vicinity of Modrath and the Erft canal, clearing Modrath only after a severe battle on 2 March 45. Continuing the attack at night on 3 March, they secured Frechen on 4 March, and continued to the east, seizing several more villages. On 5 and 6 March 45 the division repelled German counterattacks and seized more villages. The division continued to attack, reaching the Rhine River by midnight on 7 March 45. On 8 March the division cleared the west side of the Rhine in its sector. From 9 to 14 March, the division was in VII Corps reserve, relieving 1st Infantry Division on 14 March and

assuming defensive positions on the west bank of the Rhine on 15 March 45. In the first fifteen days of March 45 the 8th Infantry Division took 2,217 prisoners of war.<sup>16</sup>

The thirteen G2 Periodic Reports for the period contain thirteen IPW reports; these were summaries of interrogations for each day. From this material the author prepared twenty-six examination forms noting interrogation-derived information for regimental and division-level units, or separate units, e.g., the 407th Volksartillerie Corps, from the G2 summaries. Information used in completing the examination forms came from both the IPW Report Annex to the daily G2 Periodic Report, and from the Order of Battle (OB) Notes also annexed to several daily Periodic Reports. Only information identified as PW-derived was taken from the OB Notes Annex. Major units facing the 8th Infantry Division during this period included the 12th Volksgrenadier Division, the 3d Panzergrnadier Division, the 353d Infantry Division, and the 407th Volksartillerie Corps. One report was the result of interrogation of civilian sources. Specific information on the findings is in appendix B.<sup>17</sup>

#### Conclusions From 8th Infantry Division Reports

The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of 8th Infantry Division reports in a fast-moving offensive scenario are:

- a. The majority of information (almost seventy-five percent) provided by interrogation concerned



German identifications and locations. The one single largest item of information was unit numerical identification.

b. Fully half of the information gathered concerned the company and battalion level. Including platoon, regiment, and brigade information, division level interrogations produced 75.8 percent of the information on regiment or brigade and lower levels. Much of this was identification data. This is a correct focus by contemporary doctrine.

c. Almost all of the information collected was "current" under the study definition; the rest was mostly "historical," with almost no prediction of future activities. This was due in part to the lack of capture data in the report summaries; as noted in the methodology, information was considered "current" unless there were indications that it was more than twenty four hours old. As we have seen in the analysis of German reports, the division interrogators had interest in the present, and in some past events, but either did not ask about, or received few answers on, future events.

d. Aside from questions considered (subjectively) to be routine, the U.S. interrogators seem to emphasize the locations of minefields, obstacles, antiaircraft and antitank weapons, defensive positions, unit subordinations, artillery, and bridge conditions. This probably reflected the type of information important to

attacking forces, perhaps included in intelligence requirements. It was certainly information that a prisoner of war would be likely to know. There was almost no information on reserves or counterattacks, however. Reserves and counterattacks were probably of great interest to an attacking unit. There was also seemingly very little information about German activities beyond the frontlines; this may be in keeping with the doctrine of the time, or it may be because the prisoners did not know much, or the interrogators did not ask.

e. Based on questions asked, the U.S. had continued interest in the possible German use of gas warfare. This was probably an intelligence requirement.

#### VII Corps Interrogation Reports

The U.S. VII Corps had four IPW teams assigned to it in early 1945. The corps attached at least one of these teams, Team # 160, to a subordinate division (in this case, the 104th Infantry Division). Some IPW teams apparently supported the corps. The author sampled IPW report summaries contained in IPW Report Annexes of VII Corps G2 Periodic Reports from the period of 24 February 45 through 6 March 45.<sup>1\*</sup>

Only seven of the G2 Periodic Reports contained IPW report annexes suitable for examination; some had none. One report contained a "Special Interrogation Report" on German gas warfare. This special report did not lend itself to analysis by the study's examination form. The author

developed six examination forms for the other six reports. The IPW reports themselves had information from groups of prisoners and on different units. The major German units targetted include the 3d Panzergranadier Division, the 9th Panzer Division, the 246th and 363d Volksgranadier Divisions, and the 407th and 766th Volksartillerie Corps. Specific information on the findings is in appendix B.

#### Conclusions from VII Corps Reports

VII Corps interrogated prisoners in its offensive battles in crossing the Roer River en route to the Rhine. The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of the resulting reports are:

a. Unit identification data was the largest category of information (more than one-third of all information), followed by location and strength data.

b. Almost half of the information collected concerned battalion and regimental levels. The corps collected about 75 percent of its information on opposing corps and lower echelons, and the rest on other information not specific to an army echelon.

c. About three-fourths of the information was still "current" as defined in the study, the rest "historical." There was almost no predictive information.

d. The corps reports concerned a larger picture, not just frontline information. This is evident in reports concerning the bridge conditions and enemy movements

across the Rhine, and in the special report taken from the commander of a rocket launcher regiment concerning gas warfare.

e. The questions asked and the special report emphasize U.S. intelligence interest in gas warfare.

#### Military Intelligence Service Interrogation Reports

The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) conducted interrogation in response to European Theater of Operations requirements. One of the MIS units, the Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1, wrote PW Intelligence Bulletins in February 1945. The author sampled five of these reports. Report dates were from 3 to 13 March 1945.<sup>29</sup>

The five interrogation reports in this period had information on more than 100 subjects. Information from individual PWs or groups of PWs comprised one subject, such as detailed order of battle information on a division. The tremendous amount of information contained in these reports precluded the use of the report analysis form used in the study for other reports. Instead, the author used a macro-approach, that is, analyzed the subjects instead of the individual items of information. Specific information on the findings is in appendix B.

#### Conclusions from Military Intelligence Service Reports

The conclusions drawn from examining a sample of the reports are:

a. The greatest amount of information concerned industrial intelligence, followed by military

installations. These categories were probably of interest to strategic planners in measuring industrial, military, and economic factors, and in planning air interdiction campaigns.

b. Almost all of the information (about eighty-six percent) concerned information of a strategic, rather than a tactical nature.

c. Almost all of the information was historical. While this did not assist tactical commands in fighting current battles and campaigns, it did allow strategic planners to calculate various industrial, military, armaments, and political matters concerning Germany. The small amount of predictive information concerned "desperation weapons" that often proved to be fictional.

d. These reports indicate U.S. use of strategic intelligence requirements for interrogation. The U.S. intelligence interest in chemical or gas warfare is evident in these reports. The seven subject categories of industry, military installations, order of battle, weapons, chemical warfare, bombing effects, and mobilization probably constitute groupings of strategic intelligence requirements. The reports themselves frequently referenced previous PW Intelligence Bulletins, and in one case referenced a Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) brief on radar, which may have been a specific requirement.

e. Interrogation sources apparently underwent a screening before interrogation; officers were seldom sources at this level. While the rank and name of all sources did not appear in the reports, many did. Most of the PWs interrogated were lower-ranking enlisted men (privates and corporals). There were only a few higher noncommissioned officers, several lieutenants, and only two higher-ranking officer (a lieutenant colonel and a colonel) noted as sources. The enlisted men interrogated usually had some association to an element, such as having worked in or guarded a factory. Given the tremendous number of prisoners available to the U.S. Army in these days, it is reasonable to assume that the prisoners underwent a rigorous screening in order to separate knowledgeable PW from others. The fact that approximately ten officers receive credit by name or rank as sources leads to the conclusion that officers were not common sources of information at the strategic level.

f. Information deemed particularly important or perishable formed the basis for "Special Interrogation Reports" sent to certain headquarters. As examples, the Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1 sent 12th Army Group two special interrogation reports concerning gas warfare and disease (typhus in Cologne) during this period. These special reports probably attracted immediate attention and focused the intelligence consumer's interest on a specific matter. These reports could have responded to intelligence requirements sent out by U.S. commands as well.

### Analysis of Historical Operations

The next major section of this study concerns an analysis of historical operations. The analysis of historical World War II operations considers doctrine, practice, and an examination of a sample of interrogation reports. The analysis answers several questions:

a. What did the U.S. and the Germans do alike in World War II? (Similarities)

b. What did the U.S. and Germans do differently, due to some specific situation? (Differences)

c. What did they determine to be their own strengths and shortcomings?

d. What information did they target, what information did they receive, and what was the relative timeliness of the information received?

#### Similarities

Organizationally, the U.S. and German Armies of World War II were similar in their conduct and orientation of interrogation at battalion, regiment, and division levels. Both armies also conducted interrogation operations at corps and army levels. Both armies also did not, as a rule, conduct interrogation at the army group level. Both armies had interrogation capability above the army group level.

#### Differences

Several differences existed between U.S. and German army World War II interrogation operations. First, the U.S.

generally had more interrogation resources (personnel) at each level starting at regiment. Second, the U.S. and Germans approached interrogation at the corps level somewhat differently. Third, the Germans used techniques that the U.S. apparently did not employ.

#### Interrogation Personnel

At battalion level, the Germans had one "poor" interpreter, if available. When the U.S. organized to interrogate at battalion, it usually sent a team (six persons or less). The U.S. did not always interrogate at battalion level, however.

At regimental level, the Germans had one interpreter, who worked closely with the "special mission staff officer" (there was no intelligence staff officer such as an S2 in a German regimental staff). The U.S., in contrast, had two officer and two enlisted interrogators, and two clerks at regiment. This number decreased if the team provided interrogators forward to the battalions, of course.

Division level interrogation in the German army saw one to two interpreters per division who, with the Ic (G2) or his assistants, conducted interrogation. The U.S. had at least one and perhaps two six-man IPW teams and a six-man interpreter team.

At corps, the Germans usually employed one or two interpreters (they did other things beside interrogation, as



at every level). The U.S. corps had three six-man teams of interrogators, as well as two six-man interpreter teams.<sup>21</sup>

The German army-level interrogation occurred most often in the Durchgangslager, or Dulag. Here the Germans had two to four interpreters, or perhaps more on the Eastern front, due to the large number of dialects, e.g, Turki and Mongol.<sup>22</sup>

After November 1941, when the number of Soviet prisoners began to decrease (as a result of the general retirement of the Germans), a more thorough interrogation was possible in the Dulag. Thus there was no longer a requirement for the army to interrogate PW at army level. Rather, the PW went from the division collecting point to the Dulag. The U.S. had four six-man IPW teams and three interpreter teams at army level.<sup>23</sup>

#### Corps Level Differences

In the German system, prisoners usually bypassed the corps level, only important prisoners undergoing interrogation. In the U.S. system, corps received three IPW teams and, while it did not interrogate all prisoners, it did play a role in the first or tactical interrogation phase.

#### German Techniques

The Germans found the Soviet prisoners most willing to talk prior to 1943. To maximize its interrogation potential, the Germans used three techniques. First, they

developed questionnaires in Russian for use at the army transient camp (Dulag).

Second, on the basis of the answers, the interpreters selected certain prisoners for additional interrogation. This might occur at the army headquarters, army group (in special cases), or at the Army High Command intelligence staff (Fremde Heere Ost) interrogation center.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, the Germans formed groups of Soviet prisoners with the objective of producing a detailed response to selected German intelligence requirements. That the Germans were able to do these things is in part due to Stalin's approach to Soviet PW, which both the Soviets and Germans knew. Stalin said, "Russia knows no Red Army prisoners of war, only dead soldiers or traitors." As a result, the attitude of Soviet prisoners was generally cooperative to the Germans, especially if the prisoners hoped to gain favor with their captors.<sup>24</sup>

#### Strengths

##### U.S. Army

At the end of the war, the 12th Army Group conducted a survey of its armies, corps, and divisions on intelligence matters. After the 12th Army Group survey, the General Board considered the performance of the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations. Since the General Board conclusions and recommendations validated many of the 12th Army Group's

findings, they deserve discussion together. The results of the survey and, where appropriate, the General Board's action concerning the strengths of interrogation operations were:

a. 12th Army Group considered interrogation important enough to recommend the assignment of additional teams to division. (This is also a shortcoming, that is, there were apparently insufficient numbers during the war; see also the discussion under "Shortcomings.") The General Board Study validated this survey by accepting and repeating the recommendations of 12th Army Group in its report.<sup>25</sup>

b. The Army Group overall estimate was that interrogation of prisoner of war operations provided between thirty-three to fifty percent of information.<sup>26</sup>

c. The subordinate field armies characterized interrogation as the "most constant profitable source of enemy information..." along with tactical reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance. (Next in order of profitability were signals intelligence, agents, and document exploitation.)<sup>27</sup>

d. The armies further commented:

The Armies all agree that information obtained from PWs is by far the most important single source of intelligence and every effort should be made to increase IPW personnel as well as their quality and training. In general, the IPW teams have worked in a satisfactory manner with four teams being able to handle a total of 5,000 PWs a day on a satisfactory basis.<sup>28</sup>

e. The majority of divisions found IPW the most profitable MIS team attached: "Prisoners of war

provided the most prolific and generally the most accurate information particularly [sic] on order of battle." Another judgment was, "Prisoners of war constituted the most fruitful source of information....One division estimated that as much as 90 percent of information received by regiments and battalions came from prisoners of war."<sup>29</sup>

f. 12th Army Group also found that the MII (interpreter) teams frequently conducted interrogations or acted as interpreters for counterintelligence agents.<sup>30</sup>

#### German Army Strengths

German definitions of interrogation strengths come mainly from postwar analysis of the German intelligence system from a number of partial observers, many of whom served in intelligence positions during the war. The following represent the general conclusions of the several sources concerning the strengths of interrogation operations. The fact that they tend to voice the same opinion gives some credibility to their opinions.

a. In a detailed postwar study of German intelligence collection operations on the Eastern Front, Generalmajor Rudolf Langhäuser concluded that the interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, and civilians was the "most important and profitable" source of intelligence.<sup>31</sup>

b. Another postwar study, "The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign," characterized

interrogation as the "most valuable method" of determining the Soviet situation in the division and corps area, and to the Soviet rear.<sup>22</sup>

c. Generalmajor Alfred Toppe's postwar study reports on several strengths. Incidentally, General Langhäuser, mentioned above, was a co-author of this study as well. Toppe says that, by the spring of 1942, the Germans knew present force denominations, equipment qualities, and commanders, but also war industry, industrial possibilities, etc. With this information, the Germans could predict "the day and the hour of almost every Russian intention...." Further, the improvements in the interrogation system brought "good results" even to the last days of the war and even as the number of prisoners decreased. Toppe also adds that interrogation was "an important, if not the most important" source of information, frequently the only one used when "all other sources failed to produce conclusive results."<sup>23</sup>

d. A document compiled by Allied intelligence based on interrogations of Germans and other intelligence files and published by the War Department entitled "German Operational Intelligence" also gives German interrogation a great deal of credit. This document explored all theaters of warfare, not just the Eastern Front as do the studies cited above. This study terms interrogation "one of the most fruitful sources."<sup>24</sup>

e. General Kurt von Tippelskirch, formerly an army commander, considered information from Soviet PW and deserters "of decisive importance," providing the Germans a complete and generally reliable picture.<sup>35</sup>

#### Shortcomings

##### U.S. Army

The U.S. Army identified interrogation shortcomings in the postwar findings of the 12th Army Group survey and the General Board Study, and in observer reports published during the war itself.

a. 12th Army Group recommended the assignment (vice attachment) of four six-man IPW teams per division on a permanent basis, instead of only two teams. The recommendation considered a requirement for one team per division and one for each of three regiments. The General Board Study validated this survey by accepting and repeating the recommendations of 12th Army Group in the Board's report.<sup>36</sup>

b. In 12th Army Group experience, interrogation apparently did not contribute extensively to exploitation operations. The 12th Army Group's armored divisions found aerial photography more suitable as an intelligence source for their far-reaching "spearhead"-type operations. One reason for this was that the armored divisions generally needed information on German rear areas (e.g., trafficability, location of reserve forces, etc.) beyond the knowledge of the average prisoner.<sup>37</sup>

c. The 12th Army Group survey found a need for editorial personnel and report reproduction equipment to decrease the amount of time interrogators spend at writing and clerical work. The General Board Study later validated this finding by incorporating it into its own recommendations.<sup>30</sup>

d. There were not enough personnel at division or corps to efficiently process captured documents. The General Board Study also validated this finding in its conclusions. (This finding is important as one of the duties of IPW teams was document analysis and exploitation.)<sup>31</sup>

e. 12th Army Group units supported the assignment of IPW teams to units, instead of attachment (in this case, from the Military Intelligence Service, MIS). The General Board Study also recommended the permanent assignment (vice attachment) of interrogator personnel to "operational units" at least in time to conduct field training with such units. <sup>40</sup>

f. During the war, Army Service Forces and the Army Ground Force Observer teams also found evidence of interrogation shortcomings. In an interview with an Army Service Forces interviewer, an officer who served in the 36th Infantry Division in Italy and France as an interrogation team leader stressed the importance of timely intelligence. In this officer's experience in the interrogation of thousands of PW, the use of an interpreter

by the G2 or his assistant was a waste of time, delayed the acquisition of information (while waiting for the G2 to arrive), and never gained any useful information when an interpreter assisted. (This is in contrast to the German experience, which frequently had the G2 interrogating with an interpreter; no such disadvantage became evident in researching the German operations.)

g. The same IPW officer also found that interrogator personnel were, by and large, unfit for that duty. He considered that interrogators should have a high degree of intelligence, but that in fact, many soldiers became interrogators simply due to their language ability. In his experience, the German Jewish refugees who joined the U.S. Army were the best interrogators.<sup>41</sup>

h. An Army Ground Forces observer interviewed IPW officers in Italy concerning interrogation operations. These officers noted the delay in removal of PWs to the regimental collecting point. Presumably this affected the interrogation and, in turn, the timeliness of information collected.<sup>42</sup>

#### German Army Shortcomings

The Germans identified several shortcomings in their interrogation operations. These included German ability to exploit Soviet prisoners of war, the strength and training of interpreters, and the use of requirements in the interrogation process.



a. The Germans found themselves unable to exploit all Soviet prisoners of war because of the several languages and at least fifty dialects spoken by members of the Red Army. In addition to the language barrier, the Germans concluded that a different mental attitude existed between east and west, especially in the case of semi- or wholly Asiatic prisoners. Racist Nazi doctrine may have enhanced this conclusion.<sup>43</sup>

b. The lack of qualified, trained interpreters was a major shortcoming. There was no training for interrogation in the German army before the war, providing an inauspicious beginning. Having identified the deficiency, the Germans developed training courses which improved this aspect as the war progressed. The rapid requirement for linguists, especially in the rather unexpected Russian campaign, brought persons without military qualifications into the force. These persons were unsuitable in the military sense, even while they might have possessed knowledge on the political, cultural, and economic sense. The lack of military qualified interpreters led to such things as the need for an Ic or one of his assistants to interrogate senior officer prisoners. In critical analysis of German intelligence operations, one study considers that the Germans could not "exploit the full potential" of their interrogation system because they failed to train the interpreters well.<sup>44</sup>

c. The number of interpreters at different echelons was also unsatisfactory. As mentioned, the Germans never achieved their goal of assigning an interpreter at each combat battalion. The numbers of interpreters assigned at regiment and field army also proved insufficient, prompting these headquarters to find their own within their units.<sup>46</sup>

d. The diversity of Russian language and dialects forced the IC at each echelon to keep track of the location of interpreters speaking different dialects, as there were not enough to adequately perform the mission. Due to the insufficient numbers (and partly due to insufficient language training) the Germans at times successfully used other Soviet prisoners (and secretly, Jews) as translators.<sup>46</sup>

e. Part of the interpreter problem rested with the focus of interrogation. In 1939, the German Army focused interrogation at army level. As the focus moved downward (decentralized), especially during the Russian campaign, eventually stopping at division, the army found that it needed more interpreters.<sup>47</sup>

f. The final shortcoming in the German interrogation system was that of intelligence requirements. One postwar study was critical of the German inattention to an active requirements system, at least initially. The study also criticized the use of a standard Army High Command questionnaire even late in the war,

instead of pursuing specific requirements. General Toppe admitted the requirements system was a problem which the Germans (notably Fremde Heere Ost) tried to improve. He emphasized the importance of publishing new requirements ("work directives") frequently.\*

#### Analysis of Interrogation Reports

This section of the chapter provides a brief summary of the results of examining interrogation report samples. The focus here is the effect of interrogating at different echelons in relation to types of information, target echelon, and relative timeliness.

a. Regiment: the report sample from a U.S. regiment provides unit identification, followed by location and strength, as predominant information. The company was the predominant echelon targetted; three-fourths of the information concerned battalion and lower. Almost all of the information at this level was current. All information was of a tactical nature.

b. Division: report samples came from one U.S. division and two German divisions. The predominant information in the U.S. sample was unit identification, followed closely by location information. In all three samples, company and battalion information was one-half the total amount collected. In the German samples, strength information predominated, followed by identification in one case and location in the other. In timeliness, the U.S. sample was ninety percent current, the German samples each

sixty-five percent current. (This may have been due to the precise indications on capture in German reports that were not present in U.S. reports, causing the author to make subjective judgments of which information was "current.") The division samples contained tactical information.

c. Corps: report samples were from one U.S. and one German corps. In both cases, unit identification was predominant, each thirty-six percent of total information collected. Again in each case, location and strength information followed, with remarkable consistency in percentage (approximately twenty-five and twenty percent, respectively) as well. In both cases, the amount of current information was about seventy-five percent, followed by historical information. The U.S. sample had almost no predictive information. The German sample, for the first instance on the German side, had a predictive count of six percent. The corps interrogation samples contained almost all tactical information, but started to verge on operational or strategic information, such as information on Soviet tanks.

d. Field Army: one sample from the German army showed strength as the predominant type of information, followed by identification and location data. Historical information made up one-half of the information collected, with current information at one-third. Predictive information reached six percent. The category of "Other"

was the largest target echelon, with one-third of the information not conforming to a specific army echelon. Regiment, division, and brigade were the next most common target echelons. Field army interrogation in this sample included tactical, some operational, and some strategic information.

e. Theater level: the report sample was from a U.S. interrogation team. The predominant information was industrial, followed by military installations. The information in the sample was almost all historical, with some predictive information about new weapons undergoing development. The information was approximately ninety-percent strategic in nature; some information in the sample may qualify as operational level information.

#### Factors Unique to World War II

Three factors may have been unique to interrogation operations in the Second World War. These were the Soviet soldier's willingness to talk, especially while the German forces were winning the war; the different phases of credibility of intelligence in the German army during the war; and the ability of the United States to prepare itself over a period of years for its most critical operation: the land campaign in France, Belgium, and Germany.

The Soviet soldier had an unusual willingness to cooperate with his German captors, for reasons concerning Stalin's policy, as discussed above, and probably in part because he felt that cooperation would ensure that he stayed

alive. Many Soviet officers and political commissars told Soviet soldiers that the Germans would kill them if they were captured. While the Germans did kill political commissars upon capture, according to Hitler's commissar order, they apparently treated most PWs well initially after capture. Still, hundreds of thousands of Soviet PWs died in German hands, as discussed earlier. Generally, the abuse of Soviet prisoners (mainly starvation, but also liquidation in PW and concentration camps) occurred after evacuation from the combat echelons.<sup>49</sup>

The German intelligence staff officers experienced credibility problems during the war. Initial brilliant tactical success in a sense blinded the Germans to the need for a good intelligence system. German intelligence staff officers (Ic) frequently sought command or Ia (G3) positions instead. Many reserve general staff officers ended up in the Ic positions, especially at division level. Later in the war, when the Germans needed intelligence the most, intelligence assets and sources began to decline. Prisoners of war decreased as the Germans went on the defensive. SIGINT units were overrun. Aerial reconnaissance assets declined in number with the Luftwaffe. Even so, the Germans made good use of the earlier experience, established credibility in its intelligence system, and made changes to the extent that one German general, writing after the war, claims that the German

intelligence system still kept up with Soviet intentions to the end of the war.<sup>20</sup>

Unlike the Germans, the U.S. Army had a certain amount of time with which to train and organize for interrogation operations, especially for the critical invasion of Europe and follow-on campaigns into Germany. As in so many other relationships, e.g., staff work and signals intelligence, the British allowed the Military Intelligence Service to train with its interrogators, and to perform interrogations in British PW compounds in the United Kingdom.<sup>21</sup>

#### Summary

This chapter has discussed the analysis of samples of interrogation reports from regiment through theater level, and analyzed the U.S. Army and German Army interrogation operations considering doctrine, practice, and report sampling. As a result of these analyses, the study shows a marked similarity in the interrogation efforts of the armies.

Sampling of each army's interrogation at distinct echelons demonstrates a general consistency in types of information, frequency, target echelon, and timeliness at each comparable echelon. In other words, interrogation provided approximately the same product for each army.

The greatest similarity in interrogation operations of both armies is its organization. Each army found a need to interrogate at regimental level through theater level,

decentralizing their operations in each case to achieve this. Both also made provisions in their own ways for interrogation to support what may be termed the "national level".

There were three major differences. These were the number of interrogators employed at different levels, the approach to interrogation at the corps level, and techniques used successfully by the Germans in "mass-production" interrogation of Soviet prisoners of war.

Concerning the strengths of interrogation, both armies agreed that interrogation was a very valuable source of information. Report sampling at the tactical levels (regiment through corps) indicates that interrogation did provide usable information on enemy unit identifications, locations, and strength. Report sampling from field army and theater level demonstrated that interrogation provided some operational and much strategic information of value to planners and intelligence analysts.

U.S. and German postwar reports agreed that shortcomings included the number of personnel available for interrogators, and the lack of well-trained and qualified interrogators. On the U.S. side, a study found that interrogation did not support fast-moving exploitation operations as well as did photographic intelligence. On the German side, several studies criticized the difficulty in establishing a workable intelligence requirement system.



With this historical background, the study now turns its attention to modern doctrine. A later part of the study will compare modern doctrine to these historical lessons.

## CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt, "Russian Airborne Operations," MS# P-116, (1953): 1-2. Hereafter cited as Reinhardt, MS# P-116.

<sup>2</sup>Reinhardt, MS# P-116: 1-5.

<sup>3</sup>Reinhardt, MS# P-116: 17.

<sup>4</sup>National Archives microfilm series T-314, roll 252, frame 867 and following contains the reports. Roll 253 frame 105 and following provides information on PW capture rates.

<sup>5</sup>Most Soviet airborne units encountered in this research, except for the 250th Airborne Regiment, used the term "brigade." Most Soviet ground units used the term "regiment" for a similar organizational level. Since airborne units are the predominant source of prisoners in this sample, the brigade echelon predominates over that of regiment.

<sup>6</sup>National Archives microfilm series T-314, roll 253 frame 105 and following provides information on PW capture rates. PW capture rate for 3d Division may be inaccurate, as 3d Division produced interrogation reports during periods when, according to record, there were no PWs, e.g., period of 23-26 February 42. On the other hand, the interrogation reports may concern PW captured days before; there was no particular indication of capture dates in this unit's reports, while there often were in the 5th Panzer Division's reports. As noted, where there was no indication of capture, capture was presumed to be recent, i.e., in the last 24 hours.

<sup>7</sup>Reports located in National Archives microfilm series T-314, roll 252, frame 899 and following.

<sup>8</sup>The same tactical situation existed as for 5th Panzer Division, thus "brigade" (the designation for Soviet airborne units) continues to figure prominently.

<sup>9</sup>Reports located in National Archives microfilm series T-314, roll 252 frame 913 and following. In regard to the assumption that these are the corps reports, all other interrogation reports carry the designation of the units subordinate or superior to V Armeekorps. The author made the assumption on that basis. As noted in the conclusions drawn from examining this sample, the reports contain things that one would reasonably expect, doctrinally, from corps-level interrogation.

<sup>10</sup>Reports located in National Archives microfilm series T-314 roll 252 frame 904 and following.

<sup>11</sup>U.S. Army, VII Corps, Mission Accomplished (1945): 51-52.

<sup>12</sup>U.S. Army, VII Corps, Mission Accomplished (1945): 52-56.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Army, 104th Infantry Division, "After Action Report," (January-April 1945) provides a day-to-day history of the division; reports of 415th Infantry Regiment activity summarized here.

<sup>14</sup>Copies of these IPW Team #160 reports are in the author's possession.

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Army, 8th Infantry Division, "Report After Action Against Enemy," [sic] (February 45): 46 and following. PW capture rates from G1 Annex p. 45, and from Annex 3, Summary of Enemy Action; these two sources disagree by 2 PWs. Hereafter cited as 8th Inf Div "After Action."

<sup>16</sup>8th Inf Div "After Action" (March 45): 4 and following.

<sup>17</sup>8th Inf Div "After Action" (February-March 45): G2 Periodic Reports #225, 23 February 45, through #237, 7 March 45.

<sup>18</sup>Sample of reports taken from VII Corps G2 Periodic Reports #55-57, 61-62, 64-65 in February-March 45. Reports are in USACGSC Battle Analysis Volume 7 Part 4.

<sup>19</sup>Reports # 1/43 through 1/47 taken from U.S. Army Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1, "PW Intelligence ETO 1945, No 1/34-49" published in March 1945.

<sup>20</sup>U.S. Forces European Theater, "Military Intelligence Service in the ETO" (The General Board Study #12) (undated) p. 26 provides numbers of division and corps IPW and MII teams. Hereafter cited as USFET, "MIS in ETO."

<sup>21</sup>U.S. Forces European Theater Interrogation Center, "First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report: The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (IC Dienst Ost)" (1945) provides information on army interpreters on p. 126. Hereafter cited as USFETIC, "German G2 Service." Also see U.S. War Department, "German Operational Intelligence" (1946): 4, 33-34, 69. Hereafter cited as "German Operational Intelligence."

<sup>22</sup>Toppe, MS# P-018a: 29. USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 26.

<sup>22</sup>Toppe, MS# P-018a: 26.

<sup>24</sup>USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 25. Toppe, MS# P-018a: 35 36 discusses PW attitude. Paul Carell and Guenter Boeddeker, Die Gefangenen (1980): 260 [my translation].

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations (Final After Action Report)" Vol. III G2 Section (undated): 160. Hereafter cited as 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations." USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 30-32.

<sup>26</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 138.

<sup>27</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 116-122, 136.

<sup>28</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 119.

<sup>29</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 139-140.

<sup>30</sup>12th Army Group, "Operations:" 157.

<sup>31</sup>Generalmajor Rudolf Langhäuser, "Studie über die Beschaffung von Feindnachrichten im Deutschen Heer während des 2. Weltkrieges an der Ostfront" (1954): 59. Hereafter cited as Langhäuser "Studie."

<sup>32</sup>USFETIC, "German G2 Service:" 153. Langhäuser commanded the 12th Volksgrrenadier Division when it fought against the U.S. 8th and 104th Infantry Divisions in February and March, 1945.

<sup>33</sup>Toppe, MS# P-018a: 29-31, 36.

<sup>34</sup>"German Operational Intelligence:" 128.

<sup>35</sup>General Kurt von Tippelskirch, "Army High Command: Intelligence on Foreign Armies and the Foreign Intelligence Service, 1938-1945" (1953): 13.

<sup>36</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 160. USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 25, 30-32.

<sup>37</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 139-140.

<sup>38</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 119, 157. USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 32.

<sup>39</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 145. USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 30.

<sup>40</sup>12th Army Group, "Report of Operations:" 158-159. USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 32.

<sup>41</sup>U.S. Army, Army Service Forces, "Deficiencies in Utilization and Calibre [sic] of Divisional Intelligence Personnel," (April 1945): 1. (In the case of Jewish interpreters, the Germans agreed, but were forbidden by National Socialist doctrine from openly employing them. Toppe, MS# P-018a, p. 34 discusses the "secret" use of Jewish interpreters by the Germans, which he characterizes as very successful.)

<sup>42</sup>U.S. Army, Army Ground Forces, "Subjects of Interest to G2, AGF [Army Ground Forces]" (January, 1944): 6-7.

<sup>43</sup>Langhäuser, "Studie:" 59-67. Toppe, MS# P-018a: 14 discusses secrecy, language, and mental attitudes. These German studies on the topic concern themselves with a limitation outside their control, but responsible in part for some of the shortcomings. This limitation was the Soviet prisoners of war. The Soviet Army and government had a propensity for secrecy about the Soviet Union. This factor severely limited the knowledge of individual prisoners.

<sup>44</sup>Langhäuser, "Studie:" 59-67. Toppe, MS# P-018a: 11-14. "German Operational Intelligence:" 4, 120, 126. It is useful to note here that the Germans apparently still used the "guild" system during the war, and had grades of specialty in language studies. A soldier who qualified as a "linguist" did not get a promotion and usually worked in an administrative job at a PW camp, where a soldier who qualified as a "translator" was eligible for promotion and assignment as an "interpreter." (The U.S. system was probably not as objective.)

<sup>45</sup>Langhäuser, "Studie:" 14, 18-19.

<sup>46</sup>Langhäuser, "Studie:" 143. Toppe, MS# P-018a: 34. The reason for using Jewish persons as interrogators (on both sides) stemmed from the fact that the Jewish populations of Europe often transcended national boundaries, and thus had a penchant for speaking several languages.

<sup>47</sup>Langhäuser, "Studie:" 67, 143.

<sup>48</sup>"German Operational Intelligence:" 128. Toppe, MS# P-018a: 40.

<sup>49</sup>Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung Sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa" (1981): 42. David Kahn, Hitler's Spies (1985): 144.

"German Operational Intelligence:" 121-122, 137-138. Toppe, MS# P-018a, p. 11-12 on reserve officers; p. 31 on German successes until the end of the war.

"USFET, "MIS in ETO:" 13.

## CHAPTER 6

### AIRLAND BATTLE INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

This chapter discusses the doctrinal organization for interrogation operations in a mid- to high-intensity conflict. This chapter also discusses doctrine and factors which may be unique to, and therefore affect, AirLand Battle interrogation operations. Finally, the chapter provides results of the comparison of doctrinal organization for interrogation with the historical lessons.

#### Doctrine

This section discusses doctrine and some structural considerations. These include the authorized strength of interrogators in MI units at present.

As it so happens, intelligence doctrine is presently in a state of revision. "Field circulars" containing revised doctrine are in existence, ready for publication as field manuals and to replace existing manuals. This revision is necessary as AirLand Battle doctrine evolves and as the Army accomplishes its revised mission under the Army of Excellence reorganization. As a starting point, a discussion of still-valid, pre-AirLand Battle doctrine will set the stage.

Field Manual 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation, 1978, established doctrine as the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) concept was making its debut, providing the division commander with an "all-source"

intelligence collection and analysis capability. Field Circular 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, will become a field manual eventually and will replace FM 30-15.

In 1978, doctrine allowed for the use of interrogators at battalion in order to exploit immediate type operations or in an independent mission. Doctrine also suggested the use of "provisional" interrogators at battalion. These would come from assigned personnel who speak the necessary language and who could study the field manual for procedural guidance in interrogation, as other interrogators from brigade or higher levels may not be available.<sup>2</sup>

FM 34-80, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, published in 1985, contained doctrine relative to the AirLand Battle. This manual likewise provides for interrogation support at the maneuver battalion, but only on a limited or "contingency basis." Rather, interrogation support to battalion, such as questioning Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) on matters of interest to the battalion, is usually done at brigade or higher. Further, any interrogators sent to the battalion remain under operational control of the brigade or the divisional Military Intelligence (MI) battalion.<sup>2</sup>

At the brigade level, doctrine calls for the divisional MI battalion to provide interrogators in "direct support" of the brigade. These interrogators perform a variety of functions, including screening and interrogating



PWs, detainees, and refugees, and conducting "limited translator and interpreter support." The focus of brigade interrogation is information of immediate tactical value and speedy reporting. This interrogation usually occurs in the EPW collection point in the brigade support area."

There are also interrogators assigned to the armored cavalry regiment and separate brigade in the supporting MI companies. The regiment or separate brigade may keep interrogators in "general support" (i.e., in support of the force as a whole), or they may place interrogators in "direct support" of squadrons or battalions. The focus on speedy exploitation is the same as in a divisional brigade. The armored cavalry regiment and separate brigade may doctrinally receive interrogation augmentation from the corps, as discussed below. Presently, the army authorizes five interrogators at the regiment or separate brigade."

Divisional interrogators, assigned to the Intelligence and Surveillance Company of the MI battalion, conduct screening, interrogation, and limited document exploitation at the division EPW collection point, usually in the division support area. Based on the intelligence task organization, these interrogators also provide "direct support" to divisional brigades, and perhaps to battalions. Division usually receives "direct support" interrogation teams from the corps MI brigade to assist in these operations. Since the present heavy division has only ten interrogators authorized, corps interrogation

augmentation will probably be necessary to accomplish division and brigade missions.<sup>6</sup>

The corps MI brigade includes a Tactical Exploitation Battalion, and may in the future include another Tactical Exploitation Battalion from the reserve component. None of the latter have activated to date. The Tactical Exploitation Battalion doctrinally includes an Interrogation Company. (This company has since disappeared and interrogators are now in the Counterintelligence Company.) The interrogators in the Tactical Exploitation Battalion provide task-organized support to the corps, the divisions, the armored cavalry regiment, and the separate brigade. Doctrinally there are ten five-man teams. Normally four five-man teams would support subordinate units, one in support of each of two divisions, one regiment, and one separate brigade. The other six five-man teams doctrinally would operate in "general support" of the corps.<sup>6</sup>

Present organization authorizes only eight five-man teams in the corps Tactical Exploitation Battalion. These are insufficient in number, although presumably the reserve component Tactical Exploitation Battalion, when activated and when arrived in theater, would increase the numbers of interrogators. As a result, the corps must presently rely on augmentation from the echelon above corps (EAC) interrogation unit in order to accomplish its own mission and its augmentation to subordinate units.<sup>7</sup>

Presuming it has the assets, corps may also place its own "general support" teams at a lower echelon, for instance at a division EPW collecting point, in order to collect information of interest to the corps. This type of operation might occur in a situation where this is no corps EPW holding area, or where transportation of EPW to the corps area is too slow for effective interrogation success, or similar reasons.<sup>8</sup>

At the echelons above corps (EAC), tailored MI brigades support theater-specific intelligence needs. One doctrinal capability, presently deployed in Europe, is the MI Battalion (Interrogation and Exploitation) (EAC). This battalion provides interrogation support to higher, adjacent, and lower units. Examples of this support include interrogation in support of Army component command requirements, augmentation to allied interrogation centers, operation of a theater joint interrogation center, and support to U.S. corps and other units. Doctrinally the battalion would also provide interrogation or screening teams to lower and adjacent echelon EPW and refugee holding areas. These teams would screen EPW and refugees for referral to the theater EPW cage or interrogate them on the spot in support of theater requirements.<sup>9</sup>

At full strength, the MI battalion at EAC has 14 interrogation and three document exploitation teams, of approximately eight soldiers each. In reality the battalion has only two of the four companies that doctrine provides.<sup>10</sup>

Doctrine does not discuss specific plans to support other interrogation operations outside active theaters of operations. The specifics of this support are more properly the province of planning. There are other assets in the Army at present: the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) owns interrogation assets not presently assigned to MI brigades at EAC. It is reasonable to assume that these assets would either support theater operations in wartime, or would support Army, Department of Defense, or national-level intelligence interrogation centers, such as the World War II War Department's Fort Hunt interrogation center.<sup>11</sup>

#### AirLand Battle Implications

AirLand Battle warfare as foreseen will have a major characteristic of speed and mobility. Specific implications for interrogation operations center on this major characteristic, on technology, and on communist ideology.

The increased speed of operations has a drastic effect on intelligence at all levels. Based on the speed of operations, commanders have an increasing need to anticipate events, in order to prevent the enemy from seizing the initiative or at least in order to react. This increased requirement for knowledge into the future requires that interrogation operations be alert to the (probably infrequent) capture of PW with detailed knowledge of future operations. It also requires an ability to exploit that

PW. This task may be made more difficult if the PW is a deeply indoctrinated higher-ranking communist officer.

Increased speed of operations will also affect the perishability of interrogation operations, making the quick exploitation of PWs necessary to allow the collected information to serve the supported commander. This requirement may force to decentralize interrogator assets, that is, to move them forward on the battlefield.

An increase in the mobility of forces since World War II, a factor related to the increased speed of operations, can be an advantage and a disadvantage to interrogation operations. Mobility can assist the interrogation process when capturing units swiftly evacuate prisoners by vehicles to collecting points in brigade and division support areas. Mobile enemy forces also pose a danger to forward EPW collecting points.

While communications means have increased over World War II, so has the capability to conduct electronic countermeasures (jamming) of division and brigade radio nets. Generally speaking, the means of communication available to interrogation teams has improved only marginally since World War II. Interrogation teams still rely heavily on wire landline and telephones or on short-range FM radio at division and brigade. Since interrogation reports at corps and higher levels are likely to be lengthy, interrogators at these levels will probably transmit short,

perishable spot reports by electronic means, and the rest by courier or mail arrangements.

Distances on the battlefield have increased over World War II. This is due mostly to increases in range and quantity of firepower and the advent of tactical nuclear weapons, all of which make massed forces an inviting target. This will affect interrogation as prisoners now have farther to travel to the rear, therefore possibly increasing the time lapse between capture and interrogation.

Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet system has "politicized" the Soviet soldier today more than was possible in World War II. This means the Soviet soldier may have a deeper sense of loyalty and commitment to his fellow soldiers and his nation, resulting from long-term indoctrination with communist ideology since birth, than his World War II counterpart. This may make the potential enemy soldier more resistant to U.S. interrogation.

#### Comparison of Historical and AirLand Battle Operations

The comparison of historical World War II and modern AirLand Battle interrogation operations concludes that, first, there are similarities in the echelons at which interrogation occurs. Second, there are differences in the manner of concentrating interrogation assets.

#### Similarities

Historical lessons from both U.S. and German World War II operations validate the present doctrine of organizing for interrogation at battalion level (on an

exception basis), brigade (World War II regimental level), and division.

The U.S. Army continues to plan on interrogation at corps level, as it did in World War II, while the Germans interrogated more on an exception basis at corps. Nevertheless, some interrogation occurred in both armies at corps level. The Germans may have bypassed corps because of insufficient interrogator personnel, or in order to relieve the corps of operating a PW collection point, or because they interrogated in more detail at regiment and division, or a combination of all three reasons.

Modern U.S. doctrine does give corps the flexibility to send its teams to other echelons (lower ones in this case) to exploit PW of interest to the corps. World War II doctrine made the same provisions. Given the implications of rear battle and other missions beside operating the corps EPW holding area for corps Military Police, the deployment of corps "general support" interrogators to forward division EPW collection points is reasonable. Communications back to the corps is perhaps the biggest problem in this mode of deployment.

History and modern doctrine both provide for interrogation above the corps level. In World War II, both armies had interrogation at the field army level. The Germans had mobile teams (although perhaps not on the Eastern Front), and the interrogation center at Fremde Heere Ost (Army High Command level). The U.S. Army operated

mobile teams, one detailed interrogation center in France, a combined interrogation operation in England, and another center back in the United States.

At echelons above corps today, there are provisions in doctrine for U.S. Army participation in theater joint and allied interrogation centers, as well as support to the Army component headquarters in theater. Doctrine aside, it is reasonable to assume that the Army will participate in Army, Department of Defense, and national-level interrogation centers in the United States.

#### Differences

The philosophy for organizing interrogation assets appears to be cyclical. When comparing World War II peacetime and early wartime doctrine to the later wartime practice, it is apparent that interrogation assets decentralize, or move closer to the battlefield, e.g., to regiment and battalion, as the war progresses. In examining modern peacetime doctrine, it is apparent that the interrogation assets have centralized, or moved farther away from the battlefield again: there are ten interrogators at division, forty at corps, and more than 100 at echelons above corps organizations.

There are no doubt many very good reasons for this. Training and resource costs are two. The U.S. Army has, wittingly or not, made a concession to support this cycle by writing doctrine to provide for downward



augmentation, e.g., EAC to corps, corps to division, to bring interrogation assets closer to the frontlines.

Regardless of the reasons, there are presently very few interrogators available to support brigade and division interrogation. It is reasonable to assume that in the later stages of any future war the number of interrogators assigned to (as compared to augmenting) brigade and division echelons will increase.

Given the World War II experience, however, there is no doubt a period of some confusion and delay as interrogation assets decentralize or move forward. Both interrogators and the units they support must become familiar with working relationships. Interrogators must come to understand the intelligence requirements of lower levels like brigades and battalions, or the procedures commonly practiced there. The supported commands must come to understand the capabilities and limitations of interrogators. We have seen this before, as when the Germans failed to make good use of their requirements system, and when both German and American interrogators lacked military skills and knowledge.

#### Summary

Generally speaking, interrogation doctrine under AirLand Battle provides for interrogation at each level found in World War II experience. These levels include maneuver battalion through theater, joint, and combined operations.

AirLand Battle interrogation doctrine centralizes interrogation assets at higher echelons of command, however, than was done in World War II. These echelons are the division through the echelon above corps. The doctrine also plans for employment of these assets at least one echelon lower in wartime. All of this is consistent with the pre-war time or early war time organization and doctrine of the U.S. and German armies in the World War II era. During the war, however, both armies decentralized their interrogators, moving them down toward regiment and battalion levels.

The implications of AirLand Battle, especially the increased speed of operations, may hasten the return of interrogators to brigade and, in some cases, maneuver battalion level. By the same token, the increased speed of operations may not provide the U.S. Army sufficient time to successfully change its interrogation orientation once the war begins.

## CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation (1978): 3-32.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-80, Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (1985): 2-20, 2-41. Hereafter cited as FM 34-80 (1985).

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (1984): 2-25 to 2-26. Hereafter cited as FM 34-1 (1984). FM 34-80 (1985): 3-30 references the EPW collection point.

<sup>4</sup>FM 34-1 (1984): 2-39. U.S. Army, FM 34-30, Military Intelligence Company (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) (CEWI) (Armored Cavalry Regiment/Separate Brigade) (1983): 2-7. Information on the authorization of five interrogators in the regiment or brigade from telephone conversation with Captain Stewart, Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on 12 March 1987. Captain Stewart cited as his source the Army of Excellence L-series Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

<sup>5</sup>FM 34-1 (1984): 2-34. Information on the authorization of ten interrogators in the heavy division from telephone conversation with Captain Stewart, Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on 12 March 1987. Captain Stewart cited as his source the Army of Excellence L-series Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-23, Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) (CEWI) (Tactical Exploitation) (Corps) (1985): 18-20.

<sup>7</sup>FM 34-1 (1984): 2-41 to 2-43. Information on the authorization of forty interrogators in the corps tactical exploitation battalion from telephone conversation with Captain Stewart, Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on 12 March 1987. Captain Stewart cited as his source the Army of Excellence L-series Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

<sup>8</sup>U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Field Circular (FC) 34-25, Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Coordinating Draft) (1985): 2-13.

<sup>9</sup>FM 34-1 (1984): 2-44 to 2-45. U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Field Circular (FC) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (1986): 8-2, 8-4 to 8-6.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Field Circular (FC) 34-124, Military Intelligence Battalion Interrogation and Exploitation (Echelons Above Corps) (1985): 2-4 to 2-8. The 18th MI Battalion, stationed in Europe, has only the Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the General Support Company presently assigned. All other units organic to the battalion come from the Reserve Component.

<sup>11</sup>There are limited assets in the INSCOM Operations Group.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS

This chapter provides a summary, conclusions, and recommendations for further study. The summary discusses the research and analysis of historical experience. The conclusions, based on the comparison of historical and modern operations, answer the research question and included questions. The recommendations address areas developed during study research that merit further study.

#### Summary

The World War II experience of the U.S. and German Armies in interrogating prisoners of war was very similar. The organization for interrogation was similar, with interrogators available at regiment, division, corps, field army, and theater. Both armies also used methods for providing interrogation support to the governmental or national level. The Germans attempted to provide interrogation at battalion level, but never fully achieved this goal.

Both armies decentralized interrogation by moving their interrogation assets forward, with a focus on the regiment and division rather than higher echelons. Both armies then used intelligence requirements in some degree to guide the interrogation process. These requirements provided some centralized direction to the decentralized interrogation operations.

The major differences between the two armies were the number of personnel employed as interrogators (the German Army was more austere), each army's approach to corps level interrogation, and the German use of "production-line" techniques in exploiting cooperative Soviet prisoners of war.

Both armies viewed their interrogation operations as having been of undisputed value. Both armies experienced times when the situation negated other collection assets, but interrogation provided reliable intelligence information.

In terms of shortcomings, both armies assessed a need for better language, cultural, and military training for their interrogators. The Germans found intelligence requirements for interrogation to be a problem, but improved that during the war. The U.S. found that interrogation was not the predominant source in collecting information for armored forces exploiting into enemy rear areas.

The sampling of interrogation reports provided some generalizations about the types of information collected, the relative timeliness of the information, and the target echelons. First, information on enemy identification, location, and strength predominated. There was also an abundance of other information in the samples which does not lend itself to easy categorization: industry, economics, and armaments are examples.

Second, the samples included predominantly current information from regiment through corps, after which level the information then became mostly historical. At corps and field army there was some predictive information in the samples.

Third, field army and below interrogation samples usually focused on opposing units one or two echelons lower. Strategic interrogation focused on the military, industrial, and economic base. These target levels were appropriate to contemporary intelligence doctrine. One reason for this doctrine was to speed the prisoner to the rear for interrogation at the next higher level.

The study considered factors unique to World War II and to AirLand Battle, and then compared historical experience with modern doctrine. The results of that comparison form the basis for the conclusions which follow.

#### Research Question and Included Questions

In presenting the conclusions, it will be useful to review the research and included questions. The research question is: How should the U.S. Army organize to conduct interrogation of prisoners of war in a mid-intensity conflict, based on an analysis of World War II U.S. and German Army interrogation of prisoner of war experience?

The included questions are:

- a. Is the concept for interrogation in AirLand Battle doctrine consistent with the historical experience of

the U.S. and German Armies in World War II interrogation operations?

b. Is the present organization for interrogation under AirLand Battle doctrine consistent with the historical experience?

c. Can interrogation operations contribute significantly to the intelligence effort in AirLand Battle? In order to answer this question, the study addresses the following specific questions:

(1) Was interrogation valuable in U.S. and German Army World War II experience?

(2) Will the AirLand Battlefield appreciably change the value of modern interrogation?

(3) Can interrogation support Close Operations (traditional "frontlines" battle), Rear Operations (battle in friendly rear areas), and Deep Operations (battle in the enemy's rear areas), as envisioned in AirLand Battle doctrine?

(4) Can interrogation support the specific intelligence requirements of commanders at brigade, division, corps, and echelons above corps?

(5) Does the positioning of interrogation operations relative to the point of capture affect the timeliness of information collected?

(6) Can interrogation assist in identifying enemy deception plans?



f. Did the U.S. and German Armies encounter problems in World War II interrogation operations which may affect the U.S. Army today or in the future?

#### Conclusions

AirLand Battle doctrine for interrogation is conceptually consistent with U.S. and German World War II experience. In later wartime doctrine and experience, both armies provided interrogation at battalion (as an exception), regiment, division, corps, field army, theater, and national or governmental levels. Both armies had arrangements for joint service interrogation. The U.S. Army cooperated with the British in combined interrogations. Modern doctrine for interrogation at battalion (as an exception), brigade, division, corps, and echelon above corps (theater, joint, and combined levels), accommodates the lessons from World War II.

The peacetime organization for interrogation is not consistent with later wartime experience. In other words, AirLand Battle organization for interrogation reflects earlier rather than later World War II doctrine. World War II experience showed that a trend to decentralize assets developed over time.

The present centralized approach forces each echelon from armored cavalry regiment or separate brigade through echelons above corps to provide support to lower echelons. In some cases, interrogators will probably move two levels lower in order to accomplish the mission.

This inconsistency in organization is significant for three major reasons. These are the expected delay in wartime efficiency, the initiative required at brigade and division in AirLand Battle, and an insufficient number of interrogators.

The present centralized approach will probably cause the Army a delay in achieving full wartime efficiency in interrogation. The delay will result from the anticipated wartime change from centralized to decentralized interrogation. Such a change encumbers command, control, and communication channels. The Army may be unable to afford this delay for reasons previously stated. The delay itself presents interrogation units and intelligence staff officers with a difficult training requirement in peacetime.

For example, interrogators and their commanders must know how to support several subordinate units (brigades, divisions), such as in knowing their standard operating procedures for EPW handling, intelligence reporting, intelligence requirements, and the like. This is because there are insufficient interrogators to hold any in reserve; brigades and divisions perform reserve missions, however. Staff officers at brigades and higher must know how to efficiently control interrogation. Interrogators from higher echelons operating in direct support of a lower echelon may also have a difficult time in reporting information of interest to the parent command's intelligence staff, due to a lack of communications links.

As concerns initiative, the later World War II organization for interrogation allowed commanders at regiment some initiative because they controlled interrogation assets. AirLand Battle doctrine fosters initiative; decentralized interrogation operations would give brigades an ability to act rapidly on information gained.

The number of interrogators presently authorized, due to centralization and reductions in the interrogation force below even doctrinal levels, is a critical problem. It means that we are preparing for AirLand Battle with fewer interrogators available to division than the 12th Army Group and the General Board recommended at the end of World War II. This takes into account interrogators available (that is, authorized) at corps and echelons above corps that would or could augment the division.<sup>1</sup>

In this age of joint and probably combined warfare, interrogation will also support joint and combined commands, if not with interrogators, at least with intelligence derived from interrogation. For example, in the European theater, where the EAC intelligence organization supports the theater army (which is the army component command), there are many interrogator requirements. EAC interrogators may have to support theater-wide EPW collection points, such as those of allied forces, in order to best support the army component and the higher unified command intelligence needs, in addition to the doctrinal augmentation to corps and below

units. The likely result of all these requirements is the dispersion of limited interrogators thinly across the theater.

Interrogation of Prisoners of War can make a significant contribution to the AirLand Battle intelligence system. This conclusion sums up a series of related conclusions stated below. The conclusion presumes adequate resourcing and application of the process.

a. Interrogation of Prisoners of War was valuable in historical experience. The U.S. and German armies of World War II placed great reliance on the interrogation of prisoners of war as a source of intelligence. Postwar studies variously described it as providing between thirty-six to ninety percent of all usable intelligence, and as being the most important and reliable source of information.

b. Interrogation will be valuable in AirLand Battle. The value of interrogation historically should not change under anticipated AirLand Battle conditions. There are no factors unique either to World War II experience or to the predicted AirLand Battlefield which would serve reasonably to eliminate interrogation as a valuable source of intelligence. As the German historical experience demonstrates, interrogation can continue to provide worthwhile intelligence in situations where other systems can no longer function properly.

c. Interrogation generates valuable, timely support for Close and Rear Operations, but is less responsive to Deep Operations. Sampling of interrogation results in World War II situations resembling both close and rear operations showed that most information collected was on the frontlines or the area immediately beyond it, within the knowledge of the individual combat soldier. Less frequent in the samples, and understandably more difficult for interrogation to collect, is information about the enemy's depth. The difficulty stemmed from the soldier's lack of knowledge of events outside his echelon, except in rare cases. These cases usually are the capture of a staff officer, courier, or general officer from higher (and thus rearward) echelons, who have and can speak about information beyond the immediate battle area. These can certainly support Deep Operations intelligence requirements, but are likely to be rare (they were historically, apparently).

While a postwar study on German intelligence gave the impression that interrogation at division could provide information not only on the division and corps front, but also far to the enemy rear, the samples do not bear this point out. The U.S. 12th Army Group's experience showed that armored divisions or other fast-moving exploitation forces often maneuvered beyond the area where frontline intelligence assets (notably interrogation) could support them with information.<sup>2</sup>

Interrogation of Prisoners of War primarily contributes to Close and Rear Operations by providing information on enemy identifications, locations, and strength. This contribution reflects the sampling of historical data at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

The most frequent category in the tactical samples was identification information (numerical unit designation, unit subordination or composition, and similar topics). The U.S. regiment, divisions, and both armies' corps had identification information as the largest category. In all samples the one single largest item of information was numerical designation of enemy units. While some unit identifications can come from unit insignia, emblems, and bumper or turret markings, the questioning of prisoners concerning specifics of a unit, such as its composition or subordination, goes beyond the fact of mere identification.

The second most predominant categories were enemy strength and location information. Strength information included numbers or amounts of personnel, weapons, and similar items. Location information included sectors, command posts, weapons, and adjacent units. German divisions had more information on enemy strength than any other category. Location data was second in frequency in five of the six tactical samples. These types of

information are potentially of great use in targeting and in planning.

The smaller samples from field army and theater level provided information on strength, identification, and locations as well. The field army, an operational level, had more information on enemy strength in its sample than any other information by far. Identification (second) and location information (third) were less frequent. At the theater (or strategic) level, the small sample had information on industrial information predominantly, then on military installations. These categories encompass identification, location, strength, and capabilities (such as chemical warfare, weapons, and mobilization) information on a strategic level.

d. Interrogation can support the specific information needs of brigade through EAC commanders. At different echelons, interrogation produces different results. Interrogation at the following echelons will likely provide the following types of information in frequency, target echelon, and timeliness as shown from historical samples:

Brigade or armored cavalry regiment interrogation will probably provide a preponderance of current information, the largest set of which will be unit identifications (numerical designations, unit subordination and composition), followed closely by enemy strength and location data. This information would predominantly target

opposing enemy companies, followed by battalions and platoon levels.

Division level interrogation will probably provide us with information that is between sixty-five and ninety percent current. The largest category of information will be unit identifications (unit subordination and composition, morale, unit history and route to the front), followed by enemy strength and location information. Company and battalion information will predominate.

Corps interrogation will probably provide three-fourths of its information as current, the rest historical, with some predictive information. The corps focus will be mostly tactical, but may verge on operational or strategic information. The tactical focus will be on brigade, regiment, and battalion levels. Identification information will be first, followed by location and strength information.

Interrogation at echelons above corps has many forms. Generally, interrogation at echelons above corps should result in operational and strategic level intelligence. This will include strength (the largest category in the field army sample), identification, and location data. EAC interrogation will be largely historical, but may provide some predictive information. The target echelons include enemy divisions, regiments, and brigades at field army, and divisions and higher echelons in theater interrogations.



e. Interrogations conducted closer to the time and place of capture collect more current information; those interrogations more remote from the time and place of capture collect more historical information. This conclusion resulted from the analysis of relative timeliness in reports sampled. It is important to note that the terms "current" and "historical" have specific definition in this study. Tactical echelons have greater need for current intelligence on enemy forces due to their decision cycles. While the term "historical" may have a pejorative connotation in intelligence, operational and strategic planners have need of historical information for their own projections and to validate previous assumptions on future enemy intentions or capabilities."

f. Interrogation can provide some protection against enemy deception operations. While the evidence developed in this study is not conclusive, interrogation can apparently aid in countering or discovering enemy deception plans. The Germans made great use of this application in World War II by comparing prisoner of war statements with their extensive in-depth card files on enemy units. By so doing, the Germans could easily detect anomalies in the prisoner of war statements which did not equate to other enemy indications furnished by other German intelligence sources.

The German claim is a reasonable one. In light of German experience with Soviet "secrecy" in World War II, it

is likely that the Soviet deception plans received limited distribution. Therefore, most soldiers-turned-prisoners would have little or no knowledge of a deception operation. This lack of knowledge would therefore produce anomalies for the intelligence staff officer to analyze in conjunction with other data.

Interrogator training was a problem historically and may continue to be a problem. As both World War II armies found, the training of interrogators in interrogation techniques, military and cultural knowledge, and, perhaps most importantly, language was a difficult problem. Both armies used approaches which succeeded. The Germans moreso, but also the U.S. Army, frequently used trained staff officers to interrogate officer or specialist prisoners through an interpreter, the reason being the lack of military knowledge on the interpreter or interrogator's part. The Germans used indigenous persons (usually Soviet PWs who cooperated with the Germans) and, secretly, Jews. The U.S. employed Jewish or other immigrant U.S. citizens who spoke the target language as natives. Both armies of course employed interrogators trained in the army.

#### Recommendations for Further Study

The Army requires further investigation to determine if there are sufficient interrogation assets in current AirLand battle doctrine and organization to support all anticipated interrogation missions at all intended echelons. These missions include the exploitation of

enemy documents, manning of joint and allied interrogation centers, and augmentation to lower echelons.\*

Interrogation training also deserves further investigation. The U.S. and German Armies in World War II experienced tremendous shortcomings in trained interrogators as well as in other aspects of the interrogation system, such as EPW handling. Training problems historically included the language, cultural, and military training of interrogators. The determination of discrete training requirements by echelon may provide interrogators with a reasonable base to prepare for the next war. This could include essential language training; likely intelligence requirements, e.g., at brigade; military knowledge (order of battle and the like); and cultural subjects. These may require orientation to a specific target EPW population.

Training problems historically extended to the larger intelligence system as well as to the EPW handling system. In the intelligence system, intelligence staff officers must learn to properly task and supervise interrogation beginning at battalion, but mostly at brigade and higher levels.\*

In the EPW handling system, capturing units and military police must learn the relationships that interrogators have to them and to prisoners of war. Since the system of handling EPW encompasses Military Police, Military Intelligence, combat units, and combat service support, there may be a need for a comprehensive EPW system

study. This study might include actions relating to the handling, administration, employment, exploitation, and transportation of EPW.\*

Another issue related to training is that of personnel policies which affect interrogator selection. Given some of the past and present requirements for interrogators, for example, it would appear that persons qualified to conduct interrogations may exhibit qualities that would also qualify them to serve as junior officers.7

This study has briefly described historical methods of communicating intelligence derived from interrogations. To be successful, interrogation operations must report their findings to the appropriate intelligence staff or perhaps several consumers. The type of communications network necessary to support this reporting is a fertile subject for further study.\*

## CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>12th Army Group and the General Board Study recommended four IPW teams assigned at division. These recommendations are noted in Chapter 5 on page 124. There were six men in a World War II IPW team, of whom at least four were interrogators. Thus the World War II solution calls for a minimum of sixteen interrogators per division. Only ten are presently authorized. If four five-man teams from corps augmented the corps' subordinate divisions (assuming two divisions), the armored cavalry regiment, and separate brigade, the total at division (fourteen) would still not equal sixteen. Since the EAC interrogators must augment corps, there will be few available for division operations.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations (Final After Action Report)" Vol. III G2 Section (undated): 160. See also Chapter 5 of this study, page 124.

<sup>3</sup>At the operational level, staffs plan in advance and must make assumptions about enemy activities which will affect the future friendly operation. In this case then, information that is already four days old may assist the staff in determining if the conditions for operations they planned four days ago are occurring or not. That is, historical information may allow the staff to determine the success of its Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. For this reason, historical information is important, perhaps moreso than current intelligence, to operational planners. Concerning the worth of "antedated" information to strategic planners, see U.S. War Department, "Sources of Military Information," (1946) p.7, and "Production of Military Intelligence," (1946) p. 12 for almost identical acknowledgements that historical interrogation information was "of considerable importance for the production and evaluation of strategic intelligence." The latter study, in pages 22 to 31, provides the types of interrogation-derived information and their subsequent uses in strategic intelligence production.

<sup>4</sup>The question of sufficient interrogators in modern organization arises in Chapter 5 in discussions on the modern doctrine and organization; see pages 144-146 and 150-151.

<sup>5</sup>Historical training problems receive treatment in Chapter 2 on pages 31-32 and 36, and in Chapter 5 on pages 126-127.

<sup>6</sup>Chapter 5 page 126 notes problems experienced by a lack of appropriate interrogator and military police

relationships. See also Major Mark Beto, "Soviet Prisoners of War in the AirLand Battle," Military Review (December 1984): 59-72.

<sup>7</sup>For discussions on personnel policies concerning interrogators see Chapter 2 page 36 and Chapter 5 pages 126-127.

<sup>8</sup>Chapter 4 pages 70 and 73 discuss the German use of telephones and motorcycle couriers.

APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

### SPECIFIC FINDINGS FROM SAMPLING OF GERMAN INTERROGATION REPORTS

This appendix provides the findings from the study's sample of German World War II interrogation reports. These findings are the basis of conclusions noted for each unit or level of reports in Chapter 5 of the study.

#### 5th Panzer Division Interrogation Reports

Reports examined are from the period of 6 February 42 through 7 March 42, and represent every interrogation report marked as "5th Panzer Division" found in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (Ic) official war diary for that period. During this period the 5th Panzer Division captured 172 PWs.

#### Types of Information and Frequency

The twenty-five analysis forms generated included a total of 275 items of intelligence information. Following are the types of information in order of frequency; percentages total 99.9 due to rounding:

a. Strength information: 96 items out of 275, or 34.9 percent. Includes numbers or amounts of personnel, ammunition, food, machine guns, mortars, and artillery information.

b. Location information: 88 items out of 275, or 32 percent. Includes sectors, command posts, dispersion problems in the airborne units, location of origin airfields



from which airborne units started, routes in flight, and drop or landing zones and unit rally points, crew served weapons, artillery, and adjacent units.

c. Identification information: 75 out of 275 items or 27.2 percent. Includes unit identification (the largest category, with 58 of 75 items; this does not represent 58 units, but rather 58 unit identifications of the units in the area, such as those noted in Chapter 5), personalia, unit subordination, morale, history of the unit and route to the front.

d. Mission information: 11 out of 275 items or 4 percent. Includes mission to defend, attack, other (such as a support unit mission) and 3 cases in which prisoners did not know their unit mission when asked (the fact that they did not know their mission is information).

e. Other information: 5 out of 275 items or 1.8 percent. Includes treatment of German PWs by the Soviets and Russian war crimes.

#### Echelon Order

The examination recorded the level of information by echelon where possible, using "Other" as a category where the echelon was not specific or did not apply. The results of the analysis of these reports concerning echelons is shown by frequency below:

- a. Company level: 33.5 percent
- b. Battalion: 17 percent
- c. Other: 14 percent

- d. Brigade: 12.4 percent
- e. Regiment: 8.8 percent
- f. Platoon: 6.6 percent
- g. Division: 5 percent
- h. Corps: 1.8 percent
- i. Army: 0.7 percent

(Percentages total 99.8 percent due to rounding.)

#### Relative Timeliness

The analysis found that, in relation to the time of capture, most information provided fit into the "current category (i.e., happened in present time or in the last twenty-four hours), followed by historical time (more than twenty-four hours earlier). The figures are:

- a. Current time: 181 items out of 275, or 65.8 percent.
- b. Historical time: 83 items out of 275, or 30.1 percent.
- c. Predictive time: 5 items out of 275, or 1.8 percent.
- d. Unknown: 6 items out of 275, or 2.1 percent. This category covers all items of information cited in reports as unknown to interrogated PWs. The time of the event is unknown because the information is not known to the PW. (Percentages total 99.8 due to rounding.)

#### 3d Infantry Division (Motorized) Interrogation Reports

This section provides the results of examining twelve interrogation reports from the German 3d Infantry

Division (Motorized). During the period examined, 13 February to 6 March 42, the 3d Division captured more than thirty-four prisoners.

#### Types of Information and Frequency

The twenty-six forms generated included a total of 314 items of intelligence information. Following are the types of information in order of frequency; percentages total 99.9 due to rounding:

a. Strength information: 102 items out of 314, or 32.5 percent Includes numbers or amount of personnel, machine guns, food, ammunition, mortars, mission-type equipment (e.g., radios), and artillery information.

b. Identification information: 100 out of 314 items or 31.8 percent Includes unit identification (the largest category, with fifty-one of 100 items; as discussed, this does not represent fifty-one units, but rather fifty-one unit identifications of the units in the area, such as those noted in Chapter 5), personalia, unit subordination, morale, history of the unit and its route to the front, and the ages of soldiers in opposing units.

c. Location information: 86 items out of 314, or 27.3 percent Includes sectors, location of origin airfields from which airborne units started, routes in flight, adjacent units (including sister airborne brigades waiting to load aircraft), command posts, and drop or landing zones and unit rally points for airborne or airlanded units.

d. Mission information: 17 out of 314 items or 5.4 percent. Includes mission to defend, attack, and other (such as a support unit mission of engineer or intelligence units).

e. Other information: 9 out of 314 items or 2.9 percent. Includes ski and airborne training, effects of German pyrotechnic deception on Soviet airborne operations, civilian draft by the Soviets, and a report of jumping from a plane without a parachute.

#### Echelon Order

The examination recorded the level of information by echelon where possible, using "Other" as a category where the echelon was not specific or did not apply. The results of the analysis of these reports concerning echelons is shown by frequency below:

- a. Company level: 27 percent
- b. Battalion: 21 percent
- c. Regiment: 16.2 percent
- d. Brigade: 12.4 percent
- e. Division: 7 percent
- f. Platoon: 6.4 percent
- g. Other: 5.4 percent
- h. Corps: 4.1 percent
- i. Army: 0.3 percent

(Percentages total 99.8 due to rounding.)

### Relative Timeliness

Most information in this sample was "current" (i.e., happened in present time or in the last twenty-four hours), followed by historical time (more than twenty-four hours earlier). The following data, in which percentages total 99.9 due to rounding, provide the results:

- a. Current time: 206 items out of 314, or 65.6 percent.
- b. Historical time: 107 items out of 314, or 34 percent.
- c. Predictive time: 1 item out of 314, or 0.3 percent.
- d. Unknown: 0 items out of 314.

### V Armeekorps Interrogation Reports

Reports examined are from the period of 18 to 26 February 42. These reports were in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (Ic) official war diary. The author has made an assumption in this case that the interrogation reports marked as Abt. Ic [G2 Section] are in fact interrogations performed by corps interpreters.

### Types of Information and Frequency

The ten forms generated included a total of 242 items of intelligence information. Following are the types of information in order of frequency:

- a. Identification information: 89 out of 242 items or 36.8 percent. Includes in order unit

identification (the largest category, with 33 of 89 items), unit subordination, unit signal codes, history of the unit and route to the front, ages of soldiers, and personalia and morale.

b. Location information: 67 items out of 242, or 27.7 percent. Includes in order sectors, adjacent units, airfields of origin and routes in flight, command posts and artillery locations, dispersion problems in the airborne units, landing or drop zones and rally points, and crew served weapons.

c. Strength information: 49 items out of 242, or 20.2 percent. Includes numbers or amounts of personnel, artillery, mortars, food, machine guns, ammunition, losses of men, and replacements.

d. Mission information: 24 out of 242 items or 9.9 percent. Includes in order mission to attack, other (such as relief of encircled forces or drafting civilians into fighting units), defense and time of attack.

e. Other information: 13 out of 242 items or 5.4 percent. Includes information on a new Soviet tank, partisan situation, airborne training, other training, and equipment.

#### Echelon Order

The examination recorded the level of information by echelon where possible, using "Other" as a category where the echelon was not specific or did not apply. The results

of the analysis of these reports concerning echelons is shown by frequency below:

- a. Brigade: 28.9 percent
- b. Regiment: 16.5 percent
- c. Battalion: 15.3 percent
- d. Other: 12 percent
- e. Company: 9 percent
- f. Corps and Division: 7.9 percent each
- g. Platoon: 2.5 percent
- h. Army: none

#### Relative Timeliness

The analysis showed that, in relation to the time of capture, most information provided fit into the "current" category (i.e., happened in present time or in the last twenty-four hours), followed by historical time (more than twenty-four hours earlier). The figures are:

- a. Current time: 175 items out of 242, or 72.3 percent.
- b. Historical time: 48 items out of 242, or 19.8 percent.
- c. Predictive time: 16 items out of 242, or 6.6 percent.
- d. Unknown: 3 items out of 242, or 1.2 percent. This category covers all items of information cited in reports as unknown to interrogated PWs. The time of the event is unknown because the information is not known to the PW. (Percentages total 99.9 due to rounding.)

#### 4th Panzer Army Interrogation Reports

The next sample of reports came from army level interrogations in Durchgangslager 230 in Vyazma, the Soviet Union. Reports examined are from the period of 16 through 23 February 42. These represent interrogation reports marked as Dulag 230 found in the prisoner of war report annex of the V Corps intelligence officer's (Ic) official war diary. There are only four interrogation reports in this sample.

#### Types of Information and Frequency

The four forms generated included a total of 80 items of intelligence information. Following are the types of information in order of frequency:

a. Strength information: 32 items out of 80, or 40 percent. Includes in order numbers or amounts of U.S. and British tanks and instructor personnel, food supplies, personnel and ammunition, men and materiel losses, fuel, machine guns, and artillery information.

b. Identification information: 21 out of 80 items or 26.2 percent. Includes in order unit identification (the largest category, with 7 of 21 items), unit subordination, history of the unit and route to the front, morale, and age groups of soldiers.

c. Location information: 13 items out of 80, or 16.2 percent. Includes in order sectors and tank factories, command posts, artillery, ammunition dumps, artillery, and a map correction.



d. Mission and other information had equal frequency:

(1) Mission information: 7 out of 80 items or 8.8 percent. Includes mission to attack and other mission (link-up with an airborne unit).

(2) Other information: 7 out of 80 items or 8.8 percent. Includes treatment of German PWs by the Soviets, Soviet civilian attitude toward the Germans, and an individual officer's schooling and assignments.

#### Echelon Order

The examination recorded the level of information by echelon where possible, using "Other" as a category where the echelon was not specific or did not apply. The results of the analysis of these reports concerning echelons is shown by frequency below:

- a. Other: 33.7 percent
- b. Regiment: 27.5 percent
- c. Division: 17.5 percent
- d. Brigade: 11.3 percent
- e. Battalion and Company: 5 percent each
- f. Army, Corps, and Platoon: none

#### Relative Timeliness

The analysis showed that, in relation to the time of capture, most information provided fit into the "historical" category (i.e., happened more than twenty-four hours earlier), followed by "current" time (in present time or in the last twenty-four hours). The figures are:

a. Historical time: 42 items out of 80, or 52.5 percent.

b. Current time: 30 items out of 80, or 37.5 percent.

c. Predictive time: 5 items out of 80, or 6.2 percent.

d. Unknown: 3 items out of 80, or 3.8 percent. This category covers all items of information cited in reports as unknown to interrogated PWs. The time of the event is unknown because the information is not known to the PW.

**APPENDIX B**

## APPENDIX B

### SPECIFIC FINDINGS FROM SAMPLING OF U.S. INTERROGATION REPORTS

This appendix provides the findings from the study's sample of U.S. World War II interrogation reports. These findings are the basis of conclusions noted for each unit or level of reports in Chapter 5 of the study.

#### 415th Infantry Regiment Interrogation Reports

IPW Team #160 supported the 415th Infantry Regiment. The author located ten interrogation reports written by the team between 23 February to 7 March 45. The reports concern groups of prisoners, and themselves reflect the capture of 1,090 PWs and 94 policemen. One report covers the interrogation of a civilian. Since the reports are written to reflect dates in the period, it is reasonable to assume that there are no other reports for this period, but this fact is not known for certain.

#### Types of Information and Frequency

The examination gathered a total of 328 items of information. The types of information, ordered based on their frequencies in the sample, are as follows (percentages total 99.9 due to rounding):

a. Identification information: 157 out of 328 items, or 47.8 percent. Includes unit designations (by far the largest type, with 142 out of 157 entries), unit

subordination, morale, history of units, and routes to the front.

b. Location information: 77 out of 328 items, or 23.5 percent. Includes logistics (ammunition dump, supply, and medical locations), unit sectors, minefields, crew weapons, command posts, adjacent units, artillery, and defensive positions.

c. Strength information: 68 out of 328 items, or 20.7 percent. Includes personnel strength of units, antitank weapons, machine guns, ammunition, artillery, and mortar strengths of units.

d. Mission information: 16 out of 328 items, or 4.9 percent. Includes defend, attack, withdraw, and reserve missions.

e. Other information: 10 out of 328 items, or 3 percent. Includes bridge conditions, move of German factories, and German war crimes against U.S. fliers.

#### Echelon Order

Below are the echelons or levels of information in order of frequency of occurrence in the sample:

- a. Company: 43.9 percent
- b. Battalion: 21.6 percent
- c. Other: 12.8 percent
- d. Platoon: 7.6 percent
- e. Division: 7 percent
- f. Regiment: 6.7 percent
- g. Army: 0.3 percent

h. There were no entries under brigade or corps level units.

(Percentages total 99.9 due to rounding.)

#### Relative Timeliness

The overwhelming majority of information collected by the regimental interrogation team was current; almost none was predictive. In order of frequency here are the results (percentages total 99.8 due to rounding):

a. Current: 92.9 percent (305 out of 328 items).

b. Historical: 6 percent (20 out of 328 items).

c. Predictive: 0.6 percent (2 out of 328 items).

d. Unknown: 0.3 percent (1 out of 328 items).

#### 8th Infantry Division Interrogation Reports

This section reports the results of examining division interrogation summaries in the G2 Periodic Reports from 23 February through 15 March 1945. During this period the 8th Infantry Division captured 3,400 PWs.

#### Types of Information and Frequency

The twenty-six forms generated included a total of 343 items of intelligence information. Following are the types of information in order of frequency:

a. Identification information: 131 out of 343 items or 38.2 percent. Included unit identification (the

largest category, with 66 of 343 items; this does not represent 66 units, but only 56 unit identifications), personalia, and unit subordination.

b. Location information: 123 items out of 343, or 35.9 percent. Included defensive sectors, location of artillery, mines, crew weapons (tanks and anti-aircraft), command posts, antitank weapons, obstacles, logistics (medical points, trains, and ammunition dumps), and adjacent units.

c. Strength information: 63 items out of 343, or 18.4 percent. Included strength of personnel, artillery or rocket launchers, men losses, fuel, machine guns, and replacements.

d. Mission information: 14 out of 343 items or 4 percent. Included other missions (reserve, relief, fight as infantry), and missions to defend, attack, or withdraw.

e. Other information: 12 out of 343 items or 3.5 percent. Included information on bridges, the effect of U.S. artillery, ferry crossings of the Rhine, and use of gas warfare.

#### Echelon Order

The examination recorded the level of information by echelon where possible, using "Other" as a category where the echelon was not specific or did not apply. The results of the analysis of these reports concerning echelons is shown by frequency below:

- a. Company level: 35.6 percent
- b. Regiment: 17.5 percent
- c. Other: 16.9 percent
- d. Battalion: 16.3 percent
- e. Platoon: 6.1 percent
- f. Division: 5.2 percent
- g. Corps: 2 percent
- h. Brigade: 0.3 percent
- i. Army: 0.0 percent

(Percentages total 99.9 percent due to rounding).

#### Relative Timeliness

The analysis found that, in relation to the time of capture, most information provided fit into the "current" category (i.e., happened in present time or in the last twenty-four hours), followed by historical time (more than twenty-four hours earlier). The figures are:

- a. Current time: 311 items out of 343, or 90.7 percent.
- b. Historical time: 31 items out of 343, or 9 percent.
- c. Predictive time: 1 item out of 343, or 0.3 percent.

#### VII Corps Interrogation Reports

This section reports on the sampling of IPW report summaries contained in IPW Report Annexes of VII Corps G2 Periodic Reports from the period of 24 February 45 through 6 March 45.



### Types of Information and Frequency

The six forms generated included a total of 141 items of intelligence information. Following are the types of information in order of frequency; percentages total 99.9 due to rounding:

a. Identification information: 51 out of 141 items or 36.2 percent. Includes in order unit identification (the largest category, with 31 of 51 items), personalia, unit subordination, and history of the unit and route to the front.

b. Location information: 34 items out of 141, or 24.1 percent. Includes adjacent unit locations, logistics, artillery, sectors, antitank guns and crew-served weapons, trucks, and tracked vehicles.

c. Strength information: 27 items out of 141, or 19.1 percent. Includes in order numbers or amounts of artillery, personnel, ammunition, mortars, machine guns, and trucks.

d. Other information: 17 out of 141 items or 12 percent. Includes information on bridges, ferries and river crossing, gas training, deception, and U.S. communications security.

e. Mission information: 12 out of 141 items or 8.5 percent. Includes other missions, e.g., relief and the mission of a school unit, and withdraw mission.

### Echelon Order

The examination recorded the level of information by echelon where possible, using "Other" as a category where the echelon was not specific or did not apply. The results of the analysis of these reports concerning echelons is shown by frequency below:

- a. Battalion: 25.5 percent
- b. Other: 23.4 percent
- c. Regiment: 14.9 percent
- d. Division: 13.5 percent
- e. Company: 9.9 percent
- f. Platoon: 8.5 percent
- h. Corps: 4.3 percent
- i. Army: none

### Relative Timeliness

Most information collected fit into the "current" category (i.e., happened in present time or in the last twenty-four hours), followed by "historical time" (more than twenty-four hours earlier). The figures are:

- a. Current time: 103 items out of 141, or 73 percent.
- b. Historical time: 33 items out of 141, or 23.4 percent.
- c. Predictive time: 2 items out of 141, or 1.4 percent.
- d. Unknown: 3 items out of 141, or 2.1 percent. (Percentages total 99.9 due to rounding.)

### Military Intelligence Service Interrogation Reports

This section discusses the findings from a sample of five Military Intelligence Service (MIS) PW Intelligence Bulletins written in February 1945 by the Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 1. Report dates were from 3 to 13 March 1945.

#### Types of Information and Frequency

The five reports included a total of 118 subjects of intelligence information; each subject contained many items of information. Following are the types of subject information in order of frequency; percentages total 99.9 due to rounding:

a. Industrial intelligence information: 33 items out of 118, or 28 percent. Includes information on factories such as locations, sketches, production, number of workers, raw material sources, power sources, and bombing effects or antiaircraft protection.

b. Military installation information: 21 items out of 118, or 17.8 percent. Includes information on Rhine River bridges, logistics installations (such as ammunition dumps; petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) dumps; proving grounds; maintenance; and food supply), and defensive installations within Germany.

c. "Incidental Intelligence" information [sic]: 18 out of 118 items or 15.3 percent. Includes things such as critiques of U.S. armor and allied artillery warfare, ammunition and clothing shortages, typhus as a

weapon in Cologne, dud bombs, and the Werewolf organization (a fanatical Nazi group).

d. Order of Battle information: 15 out of 118 items or 12.7 percent. Includes detailed information on various divisions, replacement units, a reorganization of the German Air Force, and similar topics.

e. Weapons information: 12 out of 118 items or 10.1 percent. Includes a category of "desperation weapons" [sic] (such as freezing weapons, a V-bomb against the USA, germ warfare bombs, etc.) for Germany's last stand, antiaircraft weapons, long range projectiles, and mines.

f. Chemical warfare intelligence: 11 out of 118 items, or 9.3 percent. Includes information on German preparedness, measures taken, discipline, gases, training, and gas munitions dumps.

g. Two categories, the effects of bombing and total mobilization, each consisted of 4 items out of 118, or 3.4 percent each:

(1) Effects of bombing included information on Dresden, a chemical factory, and the German use of dummy installations to deceive allied bombers.

(2) Total mobilization included information on transportation inside Germany, reclamation of copper, German railroads, and the German Organization TODT (a construction engineering organization).

### Echelon Order

The reports examined had very little information on Army units, but echelons concerned included artillery regiment and artillery corps, divisions, a corps, and other army units such as replacement and regulating units, military districts, and militia. Due to the paucity of information, the author did not rank order these echelons.

### Relative Timeliness

Almost all information in these reports was "historical" by the study definition. Some of the information, such as on new weapons, hinted at future capabilities (which is in a way predictive information. There was no "current" information, as defined by the study. This is reasonable, in that the PWs interrogated by this MIS unit had no doubt been prisoners for some time.

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ETO--European Theater of Operations in World War II.

EUCOM--(U.S.) European Command.

MHI--U.S. Army Military History Institute.

MMAS--Masters of Military Arts and Sciences degree, U.S.  
Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas.

OKH/FHO--Oberkommando des Heeres/Fremde Heere Ost [Army High  
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23. Commander,  
511th MI Battalion  
ATTN: S3  
APO New York 09279
24. Commander,  
519th MI Battalion  
ATTN: S3  
Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000
25. Commander,  
363d MI Company  
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Washington, D.C. 20310-1000
29. LTC John A. Hixson  
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U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
30. CW4 Michael Kowalchuk  
104th MI Battalion  
Fort Carson, CO 80913
31. LTC (P) John C. Linley, Jr.  
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32. Mr. Michael Nowell  
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33. MAJ Mark S. Partridge  
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34. LTC R.J. Quirk  
511th MI Battalion  
APO New York 09279
35. Mr. Michael Rascati  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-1000
36. CPT Michael A. Richardson  
Headquarters Co., 66th MI Brigade  
APO New York 09108
37. Mr. Edward Rybak  
Directorate of Operations  
66th MI Brigade  
APO New York 09108
38. CW4 Richard Roehrich  
18th MI Battalion  
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39. MAJ Larry Saunders  
c/o 8714 Pintail Point  
San Antonio, TX 78239